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CRIME SCENE VIDEOTAPES AND TELEVISION TECHNIQUES
Introduction
Sobs broke the courtroom silence as a graphic videotape showed seven
bloody bodies, allegedly victims of a man the prosecution says shot up
an office to get the attention from a woman who spurned him .... The
sobs punctured the courtroom hush as the videotape permitted closeup
details . . . "It took her a while to die," Assistant District Attorney
Charles Constantinides said as the camera focused on one victim, her
dress in bloody shreds .... [Constantinides] pointed out specific de-
tails of the remains and explained that blood trails came from the vic-
tims who were not instantly killed and tried to crawl to safety ....
Some jurors who appeared taken aback by the ninety minute video
presentation covered their mouths with their hands.'
The use of crime scene videotapes in criminal proceedings gives new
meaning to the saying, "A picture is worth a thousand words." In Cobb
County, Georgia, prosecutors are convinced that a crime scene videotape
is the best tool for adding intensity to a criminal trial and routinely show
jurors crime scene videotapes in their larger cases.2 In the murder trial
of William Maddox, Jr., Cobb County jurors watched a videotape that
depicted the slain body of a motel owner, who had been stabbed over a
dozen times.' The camera showed the victim's body in a puddle of
blood, his arms, face, chest, and back slashed.' The camera then fol-
lowed a blood trail, which started from the victim's body and led to the
accused's rented room.' A blood-stained knife lay on the floor, next to a
plate of Chinese food and a glass of water.6
In another Cobb County murder trial, jurors watched a twenty-min-
ute crime scene videotape, which displayed the brutally beaten body of
the female victim.7 The camera provided close-up shots of the victim,
who had been tied up, sexually abused, beaten, and then suffocated.' The
jury delivered a murder conviction in less than forty minutes.9 In a post-
trial interview, one juror stated, "I just kept seeing that woman's body
.... It was obscene what he did to her."'" Cobb County District Attor-
ney Thomas Charron" advises, "The closer you can take a jury to the
crime scene and the facts the better .... [F]or a generation reared on
television, "this grabs their attention, [and] has a more rearing effect."' 2
1. Graphic Videotape Ruffles Jury, L.A. DAILY J., July 10, 1991, at 3.









11. 1990 Vice President of the National District Attorneys Association.
12. Curriden, supra note 2.
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Myrna Raeder 3 echoes Charron's sentiment: "[Q]uality video is invalu-
able .... When the jury begins deliberations, there's no doubt that video
provokes their memory in a manner that live testimony or still photo-
graphs cannot."' 4
A crime scene videotape is just one application of video technology
used in criminal courtroom proceedings. Because of the low cost of
videotape' 5 and its ease of use,'6 innovative trial attorneys employ video-
tape technology to create demonstrative evidence' that is dynamic, in-
structive, and highly persuasive.' 8
Videotape's power of persuasion appears attributable to the me-
dium's similarity to television.' 9 Television's extensive use in the Ameri-
can home has made the medium "intrinsic to the American
experience. '"20 Although most people watch television for entertain-
13. 1990 Chair of the A.B.A. Criminal Procedure and Evidence Sub-Committee on Rules.
14. Curriden, supra note 2.
15. Today a portable video recorder costs between $700 and $2,000. See also MARK A.
DOMBROFF, DOMBROFF ON DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE § 6.8 (1983) (the cost-effectiveness
of videotape demonstrative evidence); Fred Strasser, The Video Verdict, NAT'L L.J., June 23,
1986, at 1, 22 (videotape evidence decreases costs).
16. See also Guy 0. Kornblum, Videotape in Civil Cases, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 11 n.8
(1972) (video recorder is no more complicated than home movie projector).
17. Demonstrative evidence is "[t]hat evidence addressed directly to the senses without
intervention of testimony." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 298 (6th ed. 1991). See generally
DOMBROFF, supra note 15, §§ 1.1-2, 6.9 (use and benefits of demonstrative evidence); Joseph
W. Ryan, Jr., Techniques For Success in Preparing and Using Demonstrative Evidence, 1991
DEF. COUNS. J. 188 (describes use of demonstrative evidence).
18. The benefits of videotape evidence are numerous. It is accurate, convenient, effective,
and cost-efficient; it focuses jurors on counsel's intended message; it comprehensively presents
events or concepts that are difficult to demonstrate to the trier of fact; it reenacts crucial events
without repetitious or irrelevant information; it removes the tedious reading of an absent wit-
ness's testimonial; and it communicates in minutes what normally takes days of testimony.
Cynthia A. R. Woollacott, Video Evidence, L.A. LAW., Oct. 1991, at 25. Videotape evidence
is also extremely persuasive. See DOMBROFF, supra note 15, §§ 6.6-26; FRED HELLER, VIDE-
OTECHNOLOGY: ITS USE AND APPLICATION IN LAW (1984); Ryan, supra note 17; Gregory P.
Joseph, Demonstrative Videotape Evidence, TRIAL, June 1986, at 60; Strasser, supra note 15, at
22; Betsey Berman, Note, Have Jurors Gone to the Movies? The Case of Videotape in the Court-
room, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 141 (1988).
19. DOMBROFF, supra note 15, §§ 6.6-9. See also GEORGE COMSTOCK, TELEVISION IN
AMERICA 45-47 (1991) (prevalence and usage of video recorders in America); Robert Kubey
& Reed Larson, The Use and Experience of the New Video Media Among Children and Young
Adolescents, 17 COMM. RES. 107, 121 (1990) (experience of viewing video is similar to viewing
television for similar content).
20. COMSTOCK, supra note 19, at 128-43. In 1991, 98% of U.S. households reportedly
owned a television set. Id. at 1. In fact, the majority of households owned two or more televi-
sion sets, subscribed to a cable system, and owned a video recorder. ALETHA HUSTON ET AL.,
BIG WORLD, SMALL SCREEN 130 (1992). Furthermore, in the U.S. "typical home" the me-
dium is reportedly turned on for more than six hours a day. Gary Funkhouser & Eugene F.
Shaw, How Synthetic Experience Shapes Social Reality, 40 J. COMM. 75, 80 (1990).
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ment,2" the medium does more than just entertain. 22 As one commenta-
tor has noted, "[All] television is educational television. "23 Television
"[c]arries messages about social interactions and about the nature and
value of groups in the society that can influence attitudes, values, and
actions among its viewers. "24 Furthermore, Americans confer a special
status upon the medium. The American public perceives television to be
the most comprehensive source for news information. 2 Televised news
is perceived as credible, reliable, fair, and accurate.26 Videotape, simi-
larly, has inherent credibility, which seems to be associated with its tele-
vision presentation.27
However, the technology's capacity to persuade may make it dan-
gerous in the courtroom.28 In similar fashion to television, videotape's
ability to "stage, contrive and manipulate a portrayal of events beyond
the capacity of other forms of evidence renders it suspect without height-
ened guarantees of trustworthiness. ' 29 Jurors are deprived of actually
observing a witness or evidence, observations deemed crucial for determi-
nations of credibility and weight.30 Videotape may also focus jurors on
irrelevant images and create a long lasting and weighty impression on
them.31 Once viewed, the crime scene videotape may be extremely diffi-
cult to impeach, cross examine, or erase.32
This note argues that a crime scene videotape prejudices the defense
through means other than the use of gruesome and shocking pictures.3




25. COMSTOCK, supra note 19, at 81-83.
26. Id.
27. DOMBROFF, supra note 15, § 6.9.





33. Arguably, still photographs also provide the jury with a gruesome and graphic depic-
tion of a crime scene. However, there are significant differences between the technologies of
photography and videotape. Like television, videotape communicates a real, direct experience
from a synthetic, indirect one. Funkhouser & Shaw, supra note 20, at 80. Indeed, the elec-
tronic media, especially television, have the inherent capability to convey a sense of realism to
their viewers. Id. Realism is achieved through production codes, such as altered speeds of
movement, shifting shots and angles or inserted fragmentary images, to create movement, im-
mediacy, and a sense of "being there." Id. at 78-81. Perhaps this is the premier capability of
the electronic media: to present to the perceptual faculties a depiction of events that would be
impossible for any observer to perceive without the involvement of the medium. Id. at 79. In
short, a crime scene videotape is the equivalent of taking the jury to view the scene of the
crime. Although indirect and synthetic, the television codes used in the crime scene videotape
have the effect of conveying a direct experience to the jurors, as if they had actually visited the
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The premise of this analysis is not that a crime scene videotape warrants
exclusion because it demonstrates facts so powerfully, vividly, and credi-
bly that a jury is apt to favor the prosecution. Rather, the theory of this
note is that a crime scene videotape conveys more to jurors than merely
images featured on the screen. It is this additional information that is
detrimental to the defense. This note argues that a crime scene video-
tape, like television, uses production techniques that (1) are not readily
ascertainable by the jury or judiciary and (2) deliver a prejudicial
message to the trier of fact that is irrebuttable by the defense. a4
Part I provides background information on the use of videotape
technology in the courtroom. Part II examines California and federal
case law to determine what authority exists, if any, for the above proposi-
tion. Part III discusses production codes as analyzed under existing
Mass Communication theory. Part IV examines the use of these codes in
a crime scene videotape and argues that the videotape constitutes a viola-
tion of California Evidence Code section 352, is inadmissible hearsay evi-
dence, and violates the accused's confrontation rights guaranteed under
the Confrontation Clause. Finally, Part V proposes two solutions to
minimize the dangers of a crime scene videotape.
I
Background
A. Early Use of Videotape Evidence in Courtroom Proceedings
During the 1970s videotape technology sparked the interest of the
legal community because of its low cost, ease of use, and capability of
assisting strained urban courts with backlogged case dockets.35 Civil
proceedings presented the greatest opportunity for the technology and,
indeed, videotape was utilized to record depositions, the testimony of ab-
sent trial witnesses, and trials that later would be shown to jurors.3 6 At
scene of the crime. Still photographs do not convey the same sense of realism, credibility, or
immediacy, although the technology involved also relies on production techniques. Thus, ju-
rors are able to remain one step removed from the crime scene itself.
34. Computer animation may also be subject to the same arguments that will be made in
regard to crime scene videotapes. Computer animation is now used to create a reenactment of
the crime or demonstrate a critical issue. For example, plaintiffs suing the Ralston Purina Co.
produced a computer-generated animation to show how a large explosion was caused by hex-
ane gas from a soybean processing center, which entered the city's sewer system. See Paul
Marcott, Putting Jury in Your Shoes, A.B.A. J., July 1987, at 20.
35. Kornblum, supra note 16, at 10-11.
36. Id. at 11-36. See also J.A. Shutkin, Videotape Trials: Legal and Practical Implica-
tions, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 375 (1973); Robert M. Ward, Comment, Judicial Admin-
istration- Technological Advances-Use of Videotape in the Courtroom and the Stationhouse,
20 DEPAUL L. REV. 924, 939-46 (1971).
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the time, significant concern 37 about the prejudicial effects of videotaped
courtroom material prompted several research efforts to determine video-
tape's potential or actual effects. Significant research efforts were con-
ducted by Brigham Young University,38 Michigan State University,39
and McGeorge Law School in conjunction with Ernest H. Short & Asso-
ciates' and the California Office of Criminal Justice. Each utilized a
simulated trial in order to replicate the civil courtroom environment as
much as possible. Overall, the studies concluded that videotaped testi-
monies or trials did not negatively affect jurors' retention of trial infor-
mation, nor did they lead to any significant differences in the jurors'
decisions.41 Videotaped material also failed to negatively impact jurors'
opinions of witnesses, attorneys, or judges, or alter witnesses' behavior.42
These studies have not been updated.
4 3
In criminal proceedings, videotape technology was primarily used in
pretrial procedures, such as line-ups, police conduct, confessions, and re-
cording the testimonies of perfunctory and potentially absent trial wit-
nesses." Additionally, videotape was used to create demonstrative
evidence such as surveillance films, crime reenactments, and views of
crime scenes.45 Litigants challenged the use of the videotaped materials
37. Concern focused on videotape's effect on witnesses and the alteration of behavior
before the jury, the effect on jurors' retention levels, altered opinions of witnesses, judges, and
counsel, effects on jurors' decision making, and the overall effects of the use of recorded trials.
38. For a detailed description, see Gerald R. Miller et al., The Effects of Videotape Testi-
mony in Jury Trials. Studies on Juror Decision Making, Information Retention, and Emotional
Arousal, 2 B.Y.U. L. REV. 331 (1975); Gerald R. Miller et al., Real v. Reel: What's the Ver-
dict?, 24 J. COMM. 99 (1974).
39. For a detailed description, see GERALD R. MILLER ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF VIDEO-
TAPED COURT MATERIALS ON JUROR RESPONSE-FINAL REPORT (1979).
40. ERNEST H. SHORT ET AL., VIDEOTAPE RECORDING IN THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: IMPACT AND CoSTS (1975).
41. Miller et al., The Effects of Videotape Testimony in Jury Trials, supra note 38; Miller
et al., Real v. Reel, supra note 38; MILLER ET AL., supra note 39.
42. MILLER ET AL., supra note 39, at 44-45; SHORT, supra note 40, at 12-13.
43. Application of these results must be used with caution. The research is outdated and
was conducted only in simulated civil court proceedings. Thus, it may not be applicable to
criminal proceedings. The technology of videotape has also improved significantly. Today's
equipment is more portable, is handheld, and requires less of a technical set-up than that used
during the 1970s. Technical improvements may result in images that appear more real and
accurate. Hence, jurors are more likely to believe that the videotaped imagery is real. Even
Miller, in 1979, pointed out the possibility of a transference of credibility from the medium to
the witness, similar to the status of credibility conferred by television content. See MILLER ET
AL., supra note 39, at 14. The improved imagery may now actually influence the decisions of
jurors, contrary to Miller's preliminary results.
44. James P. Barber & Philip R. Bates, Videotape in Criminal Proceedings, 25 HASTINGS
L.J. 1017, 1019 (1974); Ward, supra note 36, at 946-54.
45. Barber & Bates, supra note 44.
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because of potential constitutional violations46  and evidentiary
problems.47 Notwithstanding the objections asserted by both criminal
and civil litigants, however, videotaped evidence is generally admissible.
In various factual contexts, both federal and state courts have concluded
that videotape evidence is no more prejudicial than a sound motion pic-
ture and is admissible upon the establishment of the proper foundation.48
B. Admissibility of Videotape Evidence
In California, Evidence Code section 250, which governs the admis-
sion of photographic evidence, also governs videotape evidence.49 The
videotape must be shown to be an accurate and faithful representation of
the objects or persons depicted,50 established by a competent witness
who has personal knowledge of the correctness of the representation.51
The producer of the videotape is not the only witness who can lay the
proper foundation. To the contrary, any witness who has personal
knowledge of the object recorded by the videotape can establish its accu-
racy. 52 The foundation requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence
are similar to those of the California Evidence Code."
Given these relatively lenient foundation requirements, the only real
obstacle to the admission of a crime scene videotape is the trial court's
discretionary power to determine whether the videotape's dangers sub-
stantially outweigh its probative value. The trial court has the power to
exclude the videotape if the danger of undue prejudice substantially out-
weighs its probative value, if it confuses or misleads the jury, or if it
wastes judicial resources or time. 4 Generally, California trial courts
46. See United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976) (denial of right to confronta-
tion and effective assistance of counsel); Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972)
(violation of privilege against self-incrimination); People v. Garland, 205 N.W.2d 195 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1972) (deprivation of due process); People v. Heading, 197 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1972) (denial of right to public trial).
47. Barber & Bates, supra note 44.
48. Hendricks, 456 F.2d at 503; People v. Moran, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413 (Ct. App. 1974).
49. Moran, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
50. Id. at 419 (citing People v. Bowley, 382 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1964)); Hendricks, 456 F.2d at
506; People v. Dabb, 197 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948) (film and sound motion pictures are admissible);
Moran, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 421 (safeguards provided by foundation required by photographs and
motion pictures are applicable to videotape).
51. Bowley, 382 P.2d at 596.
52. Id.
53. Hendricks, 456 F.2d at 506. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1001.2 (1988) (videotape evidence
included in definition of photographs); id. § 901 (a) (foundation requirements for photographs);
id. § 401 (requirement of relevance); id. § 403 (probative value of the evidence must be sub-
stantially outweighed by its dangers); Berman, supra note 18 (federal foundation rules for
videotape evidence).
54. Moran, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 421 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1988)). Under
§ 352, "IT]he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 15:749
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favor the admission of a crime scene videotape." Thus, in California, an
appeal asserting the erroneous admission of a crime scene videotape must
demonstrate that in the particular factual context, a court abused its dis-
cretion in violation of California Evidence Code section 352.
An appeal asserting a violation of section 352 must include a show-
ing, reflected in the record, that the trial judge did in fact weigh the pro-
posed evidence's prejudicial value against its probative value.56 This rule
provides the appellate courts with a record from which they can deter-
mine whether an abuse of discretion occurred. It also ensures that the
ruling is the "product of a mature and careful reflection on the part of
the judge .... 1
Typical appeals allege a violation of section 352 on three grounds:
(1) the gruesome content of the videotape is inflammatory; (2) the video-
tape is irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative; (3) the videotape is
cumulative and an undue waste of time because photographs of the scene
or victim, or expert testimony, were also admitted.58 However, a grue-
some depiction will rarely be sufficiently inflammatory to constitute a
violation of section 352. As one judge stated, "It is indisputable that
photographs of a murder victim killed by violent means are likely to be
less than pleasant."59 Furthermore, images relevant to an issue or theory
raised by the facts will render the tape sufficiently probative and admissi-
ble."° Videotapes depicting the physical surroundings of the crime and
the wounds inflicted on the victims,61 the position of the victims in rela-
tion to other physical evidence,62 and the nature and condition of the
victims' bodies, to the extent that they supported the theory of the case,
have all been found relevant.6 3 Finally, even if a videotape is ruled to be
irrelevant or cumulative, the violation of section 352 must constitute a
prejudicial miscarriage of justice for an appeal to be granted."
outweighed by the probability that its admission will ... create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or misleading the jury."
55. See People v. Pride, 833 P.2d 643, 671 (Cal. 1992); People v. Turner, 789 P.2d 887,
907 (Cal. 1990).
56. People v. Montiel, 705 P.2d 1248, 1255 (Cal. 1985) (citing People v. Green, 609 P.2d
468, 481-82 (Cal. 1980)).
57. Montiel, 705 P.2d at 1255.
58. See, e.g., Pride, 833 P.2d at 671; Turner, 789 P.2d at 907.
59. Montiel, 705 P.2d at 1255.
60. People v. Moran, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413 (Ct. App. 1974).
61. Montiel, 705 P.2d at 1256 (citing People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 708 (Cal. 1983)).
62. Pride, 883 P.2d at 671.
63. People v. Melton, 750 P.2d 741, 756 (Cal. 1988).
64. People v. Turner, 789 P.2d887, 907 (Cal. 1990) (citing People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d
1306, 1327 (Cal. 1987)).
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People v. Turner,65 a first degree murder and robbery case, illustrates
the California Supreme Court's treatment of a defense challenge to a
crime scene videotape on the grounds that it constituted an abuse of dis-
cretion in violation of section 352. In Turner, the prosecution played a
videotape that showed the house where the homicide occurred and the
body of the victim, who had been stabbed over 40 times.66 At trial, the
defense argued that the homicide occurred in self defense, resulting from
the victim's homosexual attack. The prosecution alleged that the murder
occurred during the commission of a robbery.67 On appeal, the defense
argued that the crime scene videotape, shown in conjunction with photo-
graphs of the crime scene and autopsy, and testimony from the autopsy
physician, was gruesome, inflammatory, irrelevant, and cumulative. 68
The court ruled that the videotape was highly pertinent because the op-
posing theories "depended for support on details of physical and circum-
stantial evidence, including a clear understanding of the clues provided
by the condition of the victim's body and the crime scene itself."' 69 Addi-
tionally, the court stated that the prosecution was not restricted to live
testimony to prove such details.70 The Turner court reasoned that the
jury was entitled to see how the physical details of the scene and the body
gave support to the prosecution's theory of murder for robbery.7 Thus,
the court held that the videotape, photographs, and testimony were
neither irrelevant nor cumulative.72 Finally, the court concluded that the
evidence was not "unduly gruesome nor inflammatory, hence no revers-
ible prejudice ensued."73
II
Prejudice and Videotape Evidence: An Examination of
California and Federal Case Law
A. California Case Law
California criminal case law provides no authority for the proposi-
tion that a crime scene videotape is prejudicial because of the medium's
production features. However, there are two cases that have addressed
the issue of biases in the technology, People v. Moran and People v. Dabb.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 890.
67. Id. at 891.
68. Id. at 907.




73. Id. The court did not elaborate on the basis for its conclusion. It simply stated the
videotape was not "unduly gruesome nor inflammatory." Id.
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1. People v. Moran
In People v. Moran,74 a first degree murder case, the defense asserted
on appeal that an eight-hour videotape of the preliminary hearing testi-
mony given by the prosecution's key witness, who died before the trial,
constituted a deprivation of due process.75 The defense argued that the
use of the medium was a violation of due process because it maintained
technical distortions, "unduly distort[ed] the appearance and demeanor
of its subject," and failed to accurately "[t]ransmit the demeanor of the
witness and the dramatic components of the testimony.
76
The court of appeals rejected the claim.77 The court reasoned that
"[t]he advantages and disadvantages of the filtering effect of the medium
fall equally on both sides. Therefore, its use is fair and there is no 'inher-
ent unfairness.' ,78 The Moran court conceded videotaped testimony
was slightly different from live testimony. 79 However, the court con-
cluded that a jury could still properly perform its function because such
testimony was sufficiently similar to live testimony. 0 Thus, the novelty
of videotaped testimony did not mandate its exclusion, as videotape was
no less reliable than "the reading of written transcript of the preliminary
hearing."8" In so ruling, the court noted that the heavy prevalence of
television in American homes decreased the potential distortion effects,
because viewers would be more familiar with television's "novel" techni-
cal characteristics.82
2. People v. Dabb
In People v. Dabb,83 a first degree murder trial, the defense argued
that three filmed reenactments of the murder and robbery were the result
of police coercion and therefore inadmissible. The California Supreme
Court rejected this contention because testimony established that the re-
enactments were voluntarily created.84 The defendant's rehearsal of the
reenactment scenes, a discussion on the placement of the cameras, and
74. 114 Cal. Rptr. 413 (Ct. App. 1974).
75. Id. at 418.
76. Id.
77. Id.




82. Id. In 1973, 96% of all households had at least one black and white television set. Id.
at n. 10 (citing STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF U.S. 1973, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 499
(July 1973)).
83. 197 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
84. Id. at 5.
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testimony which established that the film was an accurate portrayal were
all held by the court to be dispositive factors.8 5
However, the court did caution:
A motion picture of the artificial recreation of an event may unduly
accentuate certain phases of the happening, and because of the forceful
impression made upon the minds of the jurors by this kind of evidence,
it should be received with caution. As pointed out by Wigmore, such a
portrayal of an event is apt to cause a person to forget that "it is
merely what certain witnesses say was the thing that happened" and
may "impress the jury with the convincing impartiality of Nature
herself."
8 ?
B. Federal Case Law
Hendricks v. Swenson, 7 the leading federal criminal cases8 on video-
tape evidence, discusses the technological effects of a videotaped confes-
sion. In Hendricks, the defense asserted on appeal that the videotaped
confession was coerced and erroneously admitted. 9 The court of appeals
upheld the admissibility of the videotape confessions and concluded the
videotape proved the confession was voluntarily and freely given.90 The
Hendricks court held that testimony established that the defendant was
advised of the purpose of the videotape, its future use in court, and the
videotape's effects. 9 ' The court reasoned that videotape provided an ac-
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 798(a) (J. CHADBOURNE rev. 1970)).
87. 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972).
88. In contrast to the criminal context, federal civil litigation cases have made significant
cautionary statements regarding the potential abuses of videotape evidence. Such cautionary
language is offered when the appellate courts have reviewed the admissibility of "Day in the
Life" videos. See Bannister v. Town of Noble, 812 F.2d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1987) (The
court of appeals reviewed the use of a "day in the life" video and noted the "dominating nature
of film evidence" as one of the primary dangers of prejudice to the opposing party. "The
concern is that a jury will better remember, and thus give greater weight to, evidence presented
in a film as opposed to a more conventionally elicited testimony."); Bolstridge v. Central
Maine Power Co., 621 F. Supp. 1202, 1203-04 (D. Me. 1985) (quoting Haley v. Byers Transp.
Co., 414 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Mo. 1967)). The Bolstridge court noted that a day in the life video-
tape is questionable because of the sequences portrayed, the editing process, and the manner of
presentation, stating:
[U]se of a videotape... is troublesome because it dominates evidence more conven-
tionally adduced simply because of the nature of its presentation. "The very obvious
impact of these films would have been to create a sympathy for the plaintiff out of
proportion to the real relevancy of the evidence." . . . [V]ideotape ... may distract
the jury from other cogent issues which properly must be considered to produce a
fair verdict conscientiously derived from an impartial consideration of the evidence
See also Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., 677 F.2d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1982); Thomas v. C. G. Tate
Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.S.C. 1979).
89. Hendricks, 456 F.2d at 504.
90. Id. at 505.
91. Id.
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curate record of the events in confessions, and upon the establishment of
the proper foundation, actually protected a criminal defendant's rights.92
The majority opinion strongly disagreed with the dissent's argument that
a videotaped confession was subject to the dangerous biases and distor-
tions of television.
The dissent attempts to lump the video taping of a confession with all
forms of visual aids or entertainment, such as television or movies.
However, the videotape in question here is not a television broadcast
or a movie designed to entertain or manipulate an audience. It is not
merely a "packaging device for consumers," as stated by Marshall
McLuhan in referring to the press, movies, and radio. McLuhan, in
his book quoted in the dissent, is talking about the electronic media's
vast impact on today's audiences and of the vast opportunities to edu-
cate those audiences by means of the media.... This does not mean
that the principles to be employed in making it a more effective device
for education defeat its use to correctly detail a voluntary confession
.... We believe it a part of the procedure for obtaining justice, and
emphasize the importance of a trial truly presenting the facts as they
exist. We believe that this is best done whether videotape is used or
whether the witnesses testify in court by presenting the events and the
parties as they are.
93
The dissent argued that videotape, like television, has production
features that render images susceptible to distortions, shows only a se-
lected snapshot of the events (the confession), and has powerful sensory
and emotional effects on jurors that are difficult to cross examine or ana-
lyze.94 Strong criticism was made of the majority's view that videotape
provided an accurate record of events.
The cases holding that videotaped confessions are admissible assume
that a videotaped confession will faithfully reproduce the transaction
between the defendant and the police... [yet] ... only the confession
itself... is videotaped.
[T]hey assume the videotape will show the defendant as he truly is, and
that the defendant's true qualities will be captured on the videotape.
In fact, the videotape will tend to make the defendant look "rougher"
than he is in the flesh. The videotape camera will emphasize scars,
blemishes, or a heavy beard, and it may create shadows under the eyes
or elsewhere on the face.95
Furthermore, the dissent criticized the majority's view that playing
a videotape confession was no different than reading a signed written
confession. Quoting from Marshall McLuhan's The Medium is the Mas-
sage,96 the dissent asserted:
92. Id. at 506.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 508-09 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 508.
96. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE 125, 128 (1967).
19931
Television demands participation and involvement in depth of the
whole being. It will not work as background. It engages you. Perhaps
this is why so many people feel that their identity has been
threatened.... The main cause for disappointment in and for criti-
cism of television is the failure on the part of its critics to view it as a
totally new technology which demands different sensory responses.
These critics insist on regarding television as merely a degraded form
of print technology.
97
The dissent further contended:
A videotaped confession has a much more powerful emotional effect
than a written one .... [V]ideotaped images are fleeting and their
impact is immediate .... [Tihey cannot be easily evaluated or ana-
lyzed. A defendant has no way of evaluating how he will look and
what the impact of his appearance, demeanor, and mannerisms will be
.... In sharp contrast, defendant... knows what a written statement
looks like .... [H]e is able to evaluate how much a written statement
will damage him in the eyes of the jury.
98
The dissent concluded that in the absence of standard procedures
for videotaped confessions, the medium's strong appeal to the senses,
coupled with the "liveness" of the presentation, rendered the videotaped
confession dangerously close to infringing on a defendant's Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. 99
C. Summary of California and Federal Case Law
It would appear from Moran, Dabb and particularly Hendricks, that
California and federal case law reject the premise that the medium of
videotape maintains technological biases that will prejudice the defense.
Indeed, the language of Hendricks appears contradictory. However,
these three cases were decided when research on the effects of mass me-
dia, specifically television, was still emerging."° In the late 1960s, Mar-
shall McLuhan proposed that the medium itself, not the content
displayed, affected behavior and cognitive processes of viewers.' 1 Build-
ing on McLuhan's theory, mass communications researchers in the 1970s
began to examine the use of production techniques to shape the audi-
ence's behavior and thought processes."12 This field of research shifted
its focus from the effects of television's visual content to the impact its
technological devices have on viewers. This focus has continued through
the 1980s to the present. Thus, the more recent mass communication
97. Id. at 508-09.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 509.
100. See JOHN CONDRY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TELEVISION 144 (1989) (Research on
codes and forms of television began to emerge in the early 1970s.).
101. Id. at 83 (citing MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTEN-
SIONS OF MAN (1964)).
102. Id.
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research may question the Hendricks and Moran pronouncements that
videotape technology is not inherently prejudicial to the defense.
III
Television Codes and Their Effects
A. Television Codes
Imagine a face displayed on the television screen. The eyes are look-
ing straight ahead. The face is devoid of expression. The mouth is not
speaking nor is there any accompanying background music. There are
no alternating camera angles or zooming close-up shots of the face, nor
are any objects inserted in front of or behind the face. The screen simply
depicts a face staring straight ahead. A viewer typically reacts by chang-
ing the channel or turning the television set off. Why? Because the pic-
ture, after the initial observation, is uninteresting. There is nothing to
attract or hold the viewer's attention. It is this reaction that television
producers strive to avoid.
Television is in the business of attracting and holding attention. It
does this through the use of its formal production techniques referred to
as "television codes."' °3 Television codes are visual and auditory fea-
tures, such as camera cuts, zooms, close-ups, and pans of scenes, that are
used to make content compelling and dynamic.' °4
The use of television codes is analogous to punctuation used by writ-
ers and printers. Punctuation is "the practice or system of using certain
conventional marks or characters ... in order to make the meaning clear
.... " 105 In essence, punctuation serves as the production codes used by
printers and writers to package and deliver a written message. A period
symbolizes the completion of a declarative statement and serves as a sign-
post to stop briefly. A question mark signals an inquiry for additional
information or raises an issue to address. An exclamation point com-
municates the loud outcry, excitement, or protest of the writer. A
comma symbolizes a brief pause. Readers must learn the meaning of
these written codes and apply them in order to understand the meaning
of the written content.
103. See HUSTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 94-95 (effects of television codes); CONDRY,
supra note 100, at 144-56 (television codes and their effect on viewer attention); NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, TELEVISION AND BEHAVIOR: TEN YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC
PROGRESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EIGHTIES 25-26 (1982) [hereinafter TEN YEARS]
(the use of television forms and codes and effects on children's attention); Annie Lang, Invol-
untary Attention and Physiological Arousal Evoked By Structural Features and Emotional Con-
tent in TV Commercials, 17 COMM. RES. 275, 277 (1990) (use of production features affects
short-term attention).
104. CONDRY, supra note 100.
105. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1072 (1988).
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The production codes and the manner in which they depict the con-
tent, not the content itself, make television a unique medium. 'I Rather
than show events as they actually happen, the television producer selects
bits of information and uses production techniques, such as cuts, pans
across scenes, and zooms, to string the material together.107 Thus, the
sequence of information is based on "television codes."
Like punctuation, television codes are one method the producer em-
ploys to communicate an intended message to the viewer.° 8 Television's
viewers learn how to interpret these nonverbal messages associated with
television, and indeed, they must do so in order to comprehend televi-
sion's content."° Viewers are labeled "media literate" because they un-
derstand and apply the media codes employed by the producer.'
Furthermore, mastery of media literacy increases with age."' In-
deed, experienced television viewers eventually begin to think in terms of
zooms and cuts." 2 More importantly, once learned, media literacy oc-
curs automatically, with little or no analysis given to the motivation or
reasoning behind the use of the code." 3
Given the pervasiveness of television and its extensive viewing, it is
highly likely that most Americans are instinctively "media literate."
Thus, one danger posed by a crime scene videotape is its admission with-
out proper consideration of the use of these codes and the message com-
municated to media literate jurors.
B. The Effect of Television Codes on Comprehension and Attention
A relationship exists between the visual and auditory codes used and
the viewer's comprehension of the visual content on the screen. 4 Re-
106. HUSTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 82; TEN YEARS, supra note 103, at 24.
107. TEN YEARS, supra note 103, at 24; Mabel Rice & Ellen Wartella, Television as a
Medium of Communication: Implications for How to Regard the Child Viewer, 25 J. BROAD-
CASTING 365, 367 (1981).
108. CONDRY, supra note 100, at 146; Rice & Wartella, supra note 107, at 366-67.
109. CONDRY, supra note 100, at 156; TEN YEARS, supra note 103, at 27; Rice & Wartella,
supra note 107, at 367.
110. TEN YEARS, supra note 103, at 27; Rice & Wartella, supra note 107, at 367.
111. TEN YEARS, supra note 103, at 27.
112. Id.
113. The involuntariness of media literacy in television watching is also similar to the in-
voluntariness of punctuation while reading. Few readers actually question the writer's or
printer's deliberate choice of punctuation, such as the election to use a comma in a sentence
rather than a semicolon. Instead, readers apply their literacy skills and use the punctuation as
guideposts to comprehend the meaning of the written content.
114. See HUSTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 94; CONDRY, supra note 100, at 154-56; TEN
YEARS, supra note 103, at 27; Lang, supra note 103, at 277; Rice & Wartella, supra note 107,
at 367.
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search indicates that television codes assist the cognitive process." 15 For
example, just as children can internalize verbal language, resulting in de-
vices for mental representation, they can also internalize media codes. 116
Certain television codes, such as zooming in and out, signal to the
viewer, "zoom in on this idea,"' 7 and demonstrate how parts are related
to the whole."8I They also signal important information about the con-
tent's action, time, and place." 9 For example, camera cuts or angle
changes dictate when viewers change their focal point on a speaker or
scene; fades and dissolves denote a change in scene and/or time.'2
The use of television codes to package the content will affect the
attention of the viewer.' 2 ' Television codes have been shown to elicit
attention in the short term 22 and to guide the viewer's attention. 23 Cer-
tain television codes, such as Cuts, edits, and movement, as well as their
frequency of use, may increase viewers' attention.124 Learning and recall
are also influenced by codes.' 25 Research has demonstrated significant
correlations between attention to codes and recall for information imme-
diately following the use of the captivating codes.'
26
Television codes, particularly visual techniques, may also create dis-
tinct moods. 27 For example, in order to fit the mood and mental state of
the viewer with the characters in the film, Alfred Hitchcock filmed rapid,
flashing scenes at unusual visual angles. 28 Such scenes were intended to
induce anxiety, discomfort, and confusion.
29
IV
The Use of Television Codes in Crime Scene Videotapes and
Their Legal Impact
A. The People v. Turner Videotape
Crime scene videotapes employ television codes, although the pro-
duction techniques are not of the same caliber as television. The video-
115. TEN YEARS, supra note 103, at 27; Rice & Wartella, supra note 107, at 368.
116. Rice & Wartella, supra note 107, at 368.
117. CONDRY, supra note 100, at 154.
118. TEN YEARS, supra note 103, at 27.
119. CONDRY, supra note 100, at 155.
120. Rice & Wartella, supra note 107, at 367.
121. See supra note 103.
122. Lang, supra note 103.








tape employed by the prosecution in People v. Turner,3 ' a first degree
murder and robbery case, illustrates the use of these codes. The video-
tape starts with a long shot of the deceased's two-story house, a close
shot of the double door front entrance, and a slow pan across the house.
The camera slowly returns and lingers on the main entrance where one
door has been opened, and then pulls out and zooms in on the blood-
spattered walkway.
Next, the camera zooms in on bloodstains above the right door han-
dle, a wall, the right door's inner edge, and behind the left door. Turn-
ing, it zooms in on a cigarette butt, and a bloodied shoe print on the
hallway floor. The camera then slowly enters a room, slowly pans across
the furniture, and then zooms in on bloodied curtains, hassock, a blood-
spattered television set, and a blood-soaked couch. With the exception of
the bloodstains, the room is very clean and organized. The camera
slowly pans toward the entrance of an adjacent room and then blacks out
for twenty-eight seconds.
The camera again zooms in the blood-spattered curtains, and then
travels to the sliding glass doors of an adjacent room. Entering the room,
it closes in on a screen door and zooms in on large bloodstains left on the
door's window and on the floor.
Next is a zoom shot of the deceased's upturned, bloodied palm.
Pulling back, the camera provides a shot of the deceased's body, which is
lying face down in a pool of blood with one arm outstretched, covered
with towels. The towels are removed, and a close-up shot shows the de-
ceased in a blood-soaked shirt and jeans. The camera zooms in on a
bruise on the outstretched arm, pulls back as all of the towels are re-
moved, and then closes in on the deceased's lacerated outstretched arm.
Next the victim's bloodied shirt is pulled up, and the camera slowly
zooms in on nine large stab wounds on the deceased's back. The victim
is rolled over and the camera slowly pans over the victim's body. It then
zooms in on the victim's bloodied face. The mouth is wide open and
twisted, as if in the midst of a scream, and there is a deep gouge from the
neck to the middle of the victim's left cheek. The camera then zooms in
on the victim's lacerated chest where there is a deep gouge over the de-
ceased's left nipple.
Next is a long shot of a tree trunk with sunglasses on it, and the
deceased's driveway. The camera slowly enters the backyard, and moves
toward the screen door shown earlier. The camera again zooms in on the
large bloodstains on the screen and on the door. It enters the room, and
130. 789 P.2d 997 (Cal. 1990).
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closes in on a bloodstained bucket and carpet. It then slowly pans over
the victim's body again and across the room.
Inside, the camera slowly pans across another clean, organized
room, a dining room, and a stairwell. It then slowly ascends the stairway
to a bedroom. In the bedroom, the camera slowly pans across the un-
made bed, shelves, nightstand, open closet, and objects on the floor. The
camera then fades out.
B. California Evidence Code Section 352
The media literacy of jurors may affect their comprehension of the
images observed. The use of these codes in a crime scene videotape, such
as the one in Rodrigues, poses the danger that it will deliver an intended,
unduly prejudicial, message to media literate jurors, in violation of Cali-
fornia Evidence Code section 352.
First, the use of close-up and zoom shots, as opposed to sweeping
stationary shots, determines the visual focus and attention for the jurors.
Second, the codes used may emotionally arouse the jurors, either
through shock or fear. The slow panning of the house and outside
grounds, and zoom shots of the front door, are techniques similar to sus-
pense scenes in horror movies where the aim is to create apprehension,
suspense, and terror in viewers. In Turner, this effect is maintained
throughout the video as slow panning guides the jurors on their tour of
the house. The heavy emphasis on the bloodstains, the slow panning of
the body, and the use of zoom shots of the deceased's lacerated back,
face, and chest increase the horror of the imagery. Indeed, the bloodi-
ness of the deceased's body, the blood-soaked shirt, his bloodied hand,
twisted open mouth, and gouged back, face, and chest convey the pain-
ful, horrible death he experienced.
Third, close-up and zoom shots on multiple bloodstains, and on the
deceased's body and wounds may signal the jurors that these particular
images are important and ought to be remembered. This effect of the
production codes is analogous to written notetaking by jurors in trial
proceedings.
131
131. In California, jurors are allowed to take notes of the trial proceedings and use them in
deliberations. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1137 (West 1985) ("They may also take with them the
written... notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial, taken by themselves or any
of them, but none taken by any other person."). However, the California Supreme Court has
recognized that this authorization does not mean that "[n]otetaking is free from risks ......
People v. Whitt, 685 P.2d 1161, 1172-75 (Cal. 1984).
The court has explicitly acknowledged the dangers inherent in juror notetaking, stating:
There is a possibility that "more significance will be placed by the jurors on their
notes, which may be inaccurate, incomplete or misleading, than on their own in-
dependent recollection. The notes may accentuate irrelevancies and ignore more
1993]
California Penal Code section 1137 permits only jurors to take writ-
ten notes; notes taken by nonjurors are expressly prohibited. Function-
ing as notes, the production codes are substantially more dangerous than
their written counterparts. The production codes in a crime scene video-
tape are chosen by the producer, and are her notes, based on her percep-
tion of what jurors should remember.
It is the use of the production codes, as notes, which make the
videotape a violation of section 352. Turner demonstrates that trial
courts focus on the visual content of the videotape to determine if the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its dan-
gers. Inevitably, the probative value of the videotape outweighs its dan-
gers, because the crime scene is relevant to a broad number of issues in a
case. ' 32 This judicial focus on the videotape's visual imagery is perhaps
based on the judiciary's lack of information about the role and use of
production codes in the visual broadcast media.
Yet production codes, as notes, convey information in a very vivid,
realistic manner and can guide the jurors to assign undue weight to the
videotape. The crime scene videotape is not accompanied by a caution-
ary instruction concerning the use of the production codes.
Consequently, use of the production codes may also result in undue
prejudice. Undue prejudice results from evidence that "uniquely tends to
evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which
has very little effect on the issues." 133 Undue prejudice has been ruled
not to be the consequence of a crime scene videotape's horrible imagery.
As evidenced by Turner, California courts typically disregard the argu-
ment that these images are inflammatory and constitute prejudice requir-
ing the reversal of a conviction. Indeed, the treatment of these appeals
implies that an emotional reaction to a shocking depiction of violence is a
natural and expected reaction from jurors.
However, the jurors' emotional reaction may not be as natural as the
judiciary assumes. Production codes selectively focus the jurors' atten-
tion on the crime scene. Production codes also instruct jurors as to
which are the key images to remember. It is also highly possible that the
production codes, as notes, instruct and incite the jurors toward harsher,
substantial issues and evidence . . . . [The juror] with the best notes will unduly
influence and possibly mislead the other jurors."... [N]ote-taking may "distract the
jurors' attention from the proceedings".... [T]he jurors may be jotting down notes
on a different and less important point.
Id. (quoting People v. DiLuca, 448 N.Y.S.2d 730, 734 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)). The court
further stated that while notetaking is permissible, the "better practice is to give... [a caution-
ary] instruction." Id. at 1175. See also People v. Ghent, 739 P.2d 1250, 1261-62 (Cal. 1987).
132. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
133. People v. Yu, 191 Cal. Rptr. 859, 876 (Ct. App. 1984).
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more emotional, verdicts, based much more on the bias of the videotape's
producer, rather than on the merits of the case.
C. Hearsay Evidence
A crime scene videotape is viewed as demonstrative evidence, that
is, evidence "addressed directly to the senses without intervention of tes-
timony."'' 3 4 However, a crime scene videotape does not comport with
this definition. Typically, the producer of a crime scene videotape is a
police officer at the scene of the crime. The police officer selects the
images, the use of close-ups, zooms, slow pans or long shots, and the
duration the camera should linger on an image. Possibly, the officer imi-
tates, whether consciously or subconsciously, the production codes used
in television. In essence, a crime scene videotape serves as the police
officer's testimony as to what she observed at the scene of the crime and,
more importantly, what she thinks the jurors should see and feel about
the crime scene.
A crime scene videotaped by a police officer, whether consciously or
subconsciously, can induce a jury to render a conviction or harsher sen-
tence. The videotape in Turner emphasizes the violence of the attack
through the use of slow pans through the rooms and stairwell, and close-
up and zoom shots of the bloodstains and the deceased's open mouth and
bloody, lacerated body.' 35 More importantly, the videotape lacks resolu-
tion; the defendant is not apprehended, as in a television crime drama.
As a result of the techniques employed and the lack of a just resolution,
the videotape may deliver an intended message of the need for
retribution.
Thus, contrary to the definition of demonstrative evidence, a crime
scene videotape is evidence that is addressed to the senses with the assist-
ance of testimony. That testimony is the producer's and is asserted
through the use of the production codes.
Hearsay evidence is defined as "evidence of a statement that was
made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated."' 36 Unless the evidence
falls within an exception, hearsay evidence is inadmissible. 37 While it
may be not be the traditional categorization, a crime scene videotape can
be included within the definition of hearsay evidence. Crime scene video-
134. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
136. FED. R. EvID. 801; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 1966).
137. FED. R. EVID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of
Congress."); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200(b) ("Except as provided by law, hearsay evidence is
inadmissible.").
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tapes are generally made during the investigatory stage of a crime. Thus,
the crime scene videotape is the producer's out-of-court statement.
Hearsay is not limited to an oral or written statement. Nonverbal
conduct "intended by the person as an assertion" also qualifies as hearsay
evidence.13 A crime scene videotape fits within this definition. It is the
use of the production codes, not just the visual content, that make the
crime scene videotape hearsay evidence. As discussed previously, the de-
liberate selection and use of production codes are the methods by which
the producer asserts to the jurors not only what she observed, but also
how the jurors are to observe the crime scene. The production codes
transform the crime scene videotape into the biased testimony of the pro-
ducer. Although a crime scene videotape is titled "demonstrative evi-
dence," it is used to corroborate or support139 the witness's testimony,
theory, or fact of the case. " When proffered as corroborative evidence,
there can be no doubt that the crime scene videotape is used to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. 1
41
The foundation requirements also result in defining the crime scene
videotape as hearsay evidence. The reliability of the videotape depends
on the credibility of its producer. Yet under both the California Evi-
dence Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence, anyone who was present
at the time of its filming may provide the requisite foundation that the
crime scene videotape portrays an accurate and faithful representation of
the scene filmed. 42 The actual producer of the crime scene videotape is
not compelled to testify at trial. Thus, the out-of-court testimony and
any biased message contained within that testimony may be communi-
cated to jurors without the actual declarant, the producer, and her mo-
tives and perceptions being subject to cross examination.
The above analysis has demonstrated how a crime scene videotape
fits within the definition of hearsay evidence. Its admission, therefore, is
based on whether it fits within a recognized hearsay exception. This
question will be examined in the Confrontation Clause analysis below.
138. FED. R. EvID. 801(a); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200.
139. Corroborate is defined as "to support or confirm by new evidence; attest the truth or
accuracy of." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 327 (2d college ed. 1985). Support is de-
fined as "to furnish corroborating evidence." Id. at 1222.
140. People v. Turner, 789 P.2d 887, 907 (Cal. 1990).
141. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13.1 n.2 (2d
ed. 1987). "Whatever the technical limits of demonstrative evidence, practicing lawyers regard
it as having probative force." (citing Melvin Belli, Demonstrative Evidence and the Adequate
Award, 22 Miss. L.J. 284 (1951)); 3 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 791, at 227 (J. CHAD-
BOURNE rev. 1970) ("A map or diagram used as part of a witness's testimony is 'evidence like
any other part of the witness's utterance.' ").
142. For the California foundation requirements, see supra notes 49-52 and accompanying
text. For the federal foundation requirements see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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D. The Confrontation Clause and Out-of-Court Statements
The Sixth Amendment and Article I of the California Constitution
both afford the accused the right to confront all witnesses against her. 143
California follows the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause set
forth by the United States Supreme Court. 1" Thus, the Confrontation
Clause analysis below utilizes federal case law but applies equally to the
interpretation afforded to California's constitutional provision. 145
At present, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause distinguishes between violations posed by the admission of out-of-
court statements and the procedures used regarding in-court state-
ments. 146 When the challenged evidence is an out-of-court statement-
hearsay evidence-the issue is whether its admission violates the ac-
cused's constitutional right to confront a witness.147 This is the question
raised by a crime scene videotape.
A literal reading of the Confrontation Clause mandates the exclu-
sion of all hearsay evidence because of the declarant's unavailability to
take the stand. 141 Yet the Supreme Court has never adopted that posi-
tion and has rejected on numerous occasions the position that the Con-
frontation Clause is a blanket prohibition on the admission of hearsay
143. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth Amendment
applies to the states); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (amended 1974).
144. See People v. Alcala, 842 P.2d 1192, 1216-17 (Cal. 1992); In re Kerry 0., 258 Cal.
Rptr. 448, 451-53 (Ct. App. 1989); People v. Hughey, 240 Cal. Rptr. 269, 272-76 (Ct. App.
1987) (review of Confrontation Clause).
145. The analysis utilizes the Confrontation Clause model set forth by Professor Im-
winkelried. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Constitutionalization of Hearsay: The Extent to
Which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments Permit or Require the Liberalization of the Hearsay
Rules, 76 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1992).
146. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743-44 (1992) (distinguishing White from Maryland
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), and Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988)).
147. Id. The Court contrasts this question with the Confrontation Clause challenge raised
by the in-court statements of a witness hidden from the defendant. There, the issue is the
adequacy of the confrontation itself and whether the lack of actual face-to-face confrontation
in the courtroom is a violation of the accused's right to confrontation. Id. The Court has most
recently addressed this question in the context of a child abuse victim who testifies behind a
screen, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), or via a closed circuit television, Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836 (1990). The Court's response to this question is that the Confrontation Clause
expresses a preference for face-to-face encounters between a criminal defendant and her accus-
ers. Craig, 497 U.S. at 849-50. However, that preference is not absolute. Id. at 844 (citing
Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021). In certain contexts, such as hearsay statements of an unavailable
witness, face-to-face confrontations are not always required. Id. at 847-48. The Court recog-
nizes that the furtherance of public policies "rooted firmly in jurisprudence" may necessitate
an exception to the preference for physical confrontation. Id. at 849-50; Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-
21. Presently, the Court has recognized that the protection of alleged victims of child abuse
from additional harm is an important public policy compelling an exception to the require-
ment of face-to-face confrontation. Craig, 497 U.S. at 852.
148. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
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evidence. 149 Hence, the question is: under what circumstances does the
use of hearsay evidence constitute a violation of the Confrontation
Clause?
The Confrontation Clause serves to ensure the reliability of a wit-
ness's testimony and thereby protects the fact finding process of the
trial. 5o Thus, hearsay evidence is admissible if it satisfies the reliability
requirements of the Clause. To that end, the Court has established the
contexts in which hearsay evidence meets the Clause's reliability criteria:
(1) where there has been opportunity for cross examination and (2)
where there are sufficient indicia of reliability.
1. Cross Examination
The right to confrontation is closely associated with the right to
cross examination.5 Heralded as the "greatest legal engine ever in-
vented for the discovery of truth," cross examination is the central means
for testing the accuracy of testimonial evidence.' 2 California v. Green '
149. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 844 ("We have never held, however, that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with wit-
nesses against them at trial."); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 ("We have accordingly stated that a
literal reading of the Confrontation Clause would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a
result long rejected as unintended and too extreme.") (citation omitted); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) ("This Court long ago held that admitting the prior testimony of an
unavailable witness does not violate the Confrontation Clause.") (citing Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)). See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965); Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 (1968).
150. See White, 112 S. Ct. at 743 ("[T]he Confrontation Clause has as a basic purpose the
promotion of the 'integrity of the fact finding process.' ") (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020). See
also Craig, 497 U.S. at 846 ("[T]he right to confrontation is a functional one for the purpose of
promoting reliability in a criminal trial.") (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739
(1987)).
151. Craig, 497 U.S. at 847 (explaining that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is
satisfied through cross examination); 3 WIGMORE, supra note 141, § 1367.
152. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
153. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). In Green, the Supreme Court recognized the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the right to cross examination, stating, "It is this literal right to 'confront'
the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation
Clause." Id. at 157. In Green, the defendant was convicted of furnishing a minor with mari-
juana in violation of California law. Id. at 151-53. At the preliminary hearing, the minor
testified that the defendant directed him to the location of the drugs. Id. This testimony was
subject to extensive cross examination by defense counsel. Id. At trial, the minor was unable
to recall the events accurately. Id. at 152. Excerpts from the minor's preliminary hearing
testimony were read to refresh his memory, pursuant to a California statute that admitted
inconsistent out-of-court statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Id. Respondent
challenged his conviction on the grounds that the preliminary hearing testimony violated his
right to confrontation. Id. at 153. The Supreme Court rejected respondent's challenge and
held the admission of a declarant's out-of-court statements does not violate the Confrontation
Clause when the declarant testifies at the trial as a witness and is subject to "full and effective"
cross examination. Id. at 164. Furthermore, while the facts of Green did not present the
question, the Supreme Court also reaffirmed that there is no violation of the Confrontation
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sets forth the first context that allows the admission of out-of-court state-
ments. Hearsay statements are admissible if (1) at the trial the declarant
is called as a witness and subject to cross examination154 or (2) the de-
clarant is unavailable, yet prior to the trial there was an opportunity for
cross examination.
155
People v. Moran'56 illustrates the Green analysis. In Moran, the de-
fense on appeal argued that violation of the right to confrontation re-
sulted from the use of videotaped preliminary hearing testimony of the
key prosecution witness, who died before trial. 15 7 The Moran court, ap-
plying the second prong of Green, held that testimony of an unavailable
witness at a preliminary hearing may be entered at trial as former testi-
mony, as long as the accused was afforded a complete and adequate op-
portunity to cross examine the witness. 5 ' The defense's contention was
rejected for three reasons. First, the condition of the witness was known
to both parties. Second, the defense was informed the tape would be used
at trial and made no objections. Finally, the defense extensively exer-
cised their right, on videotape, to cross examine the witness at the pre-
liminary hearing.5 9 Therefore, the court concluded that the use of the
videotaped testimony did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses.' 6°
A crime scene videotape, on the other hand, does not satisfy Green's
reliability requirement. As noted above, the use of the production codes,
in effect, transforms the crime scene videotape into the producer's hear-
say testimony. Contrary to Green, it is entirely possible to admit testi-
mony without an opportunity to cross examine the producer at trial.
The foundation requirements allow anyone who was present at the scene
during the taping to testify that it is an accurate and faithful representa-
tion. It is within the discretion of the prosecution to determine whether
Clause by the admission of prior testimony of a witness who is unavailable to appear at trial if
there was prior opportunity for cross examination. Id. at 166. However, the Supreme Court
noted the witness must be physically unavailable to appear before the trier of fact, through no
fault of the State's, and the State must make every effort to secure the presence of the witness.
Id. This latter requirement of unavailability has been subsequently rejected under White v.
Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 (1992). See infra note 204.
154. Green, 399 U.S. at 157-63 (explaining that cross examination of hearsay declarant at
trial subjects declarant to rigors of adversarial proceeding and cures hearsay statement of de-
fects contributing to its unreliability).
155. Id. at 165-67 (explaining that cross examination at preliminary hearing substantially
complies with purpose of the Confrontation Clause).
156. 114 Cal. Rptr. 413 (Ct. App. 1974).
157. Id. at 416-17.




the producer, the declarant of the out-of-court testimony, will be ques-
tioned before the trier of fact.
Furthermore, in contrast to Moran, there is no preliminary hearing
where cross examination of the producer occurs, nor is there an
equivalent procedure where the defense may effectively question the tap-
ing tactics chosen by the police. The biased testimony of the producer is
admitted and shown to the trier of fact without being subjected to "a
rigorous adversarial proceeding," 6 ' which would ensure the reliability of
the videotaped testimony. The Green court stated repeatedly that the
taking of an oath by a witness, cross examination, and the opportunity
for the jury to observe the demeanor of the witness are all protections
implicit in the right of confrontation. 62 Each serves to ensure the relia-
bility of the testimony of a witness. Yet the videotaped testimony of the
producer is admissible without her pledge that her testimony, as con-
veyed through the videotape, is not perjurious; she is not cross examined,
and the jury has no grounds upon which to judge her credibility.
2. Indicia of Reliability
Recognizing that an opportunity for cross examination of the de-
clarant, either before or during the trial, may not be possible in every
factual circumstance, the Supreme Court has stated that reliability may
be inferred by showing "adequate indicia of reliability" of the out-of-
court statement.1 63 Accuracy or reliability may be established upon a
showing that (1) the out-of-court statement falls within a firmly rooted
161. The Craig Court noted, "The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure
the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in
the context of an adversarial proceeding before the trier of fact." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.
836, 845 (1990).
162. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-63 (1970).
163. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). In Roberts, respondent was convicted of
forgery, receiving stolen checkbooks and credit cards, and possession of heroin. Id. at 60. At
trial, respondent testified that the victim's daughter had given him both the checkbooks and
the credit cards and permission to use them. Id. at 58-59. The daughter was unavailable to
testify at respondent's trial. Id. Instead, the prosecution impeached respondent's testimony by
reading the preliminary examination testimony of the daughter in which she denied giving the
property to the respondent without informing him that she did not have permission to use it.
Id. Respondent challenged his conviction on the grounds that it violated his right to confron-
tation. Id. at 60-62. In rejecting respondent's argument, the Supreme Court held cross exami-
nation of a hearsay declarant may be substituted by proof of the witness's unavailability and
other evidence of reliability or accuracy. Id. at 66. Initially, Roberts was interpreted as estab-
lishing a constitutional requirement that the prosecution must prove the unavailability of the
hearsay witness in all cases where an out-of-court statement was offered. Imwinkelried, supra
note 145, at 533-35. The Court subsequently restricted this aspect of Roberts in White v.
Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992). See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
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hearsay exception,1 ' or (2) the out-of-court statement possesses precise
"guarantees of trustworthiness." '65 The reliability of an out-of-court
statement that does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception is
presumed insufficient: this presumption is rebuttable upon a showing of
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." '166
a. Hearsay Exceptions
Hearsay exceptions are premised on the theory that certain state-
ments possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 167 The pres-
ence of the declarant at trial, therefore, is not necessary. 6 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has held that statements which fall within the defini-
tion of a hearsay exception firmly rooted in the jurisprudence are pre-
sumed reliable for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause.169 Thus, one
question is whether a crime scene videotape fits within the definition of a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. The analysis below argues that a crime
scene videotape does not fit within the federal or California hearsay
exceptions.
California combines the requirements of the federal "present sense
impressions" and "excited utterances" exceptions into a single hearsay
exception, "spontaneous declarations." 170  Thus, this note's analysis of
the federal exceptions' applicability to a crime scene videotape applies
equally to the California exception.
164. The reliability of an out-of-court statement that falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception will be presumed sufficient. Id. at 66 ("[C]ertain hearsay exceptions rest upon such
solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the
'substance of the constitutional protection.'. . . Reliability can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."); White, 112. S. Ct. at
743 ("[A] statement that qualifies for admission under a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception is so
trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its reliability."); see also
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987).
165. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; White, 112 S. Ct. at 744. See also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805, 815-16 (1990); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986).
166. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 ("In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent
a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."); Wright, 497 U.S. at 816 (quoting
Lee, 476 U.S. at 543).
167. FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note.
168. Id.
169. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743 (1992) ("[A] statement that qualifies for admis-
sion under a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be
expected to add little to its reliability."). Presently the Supreme Court has found that sponta-
neous declarations and statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment
sufficiently qualify as firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. Id. See infra note 204. Statements
made by co-conspirators are also considered firmly rooted. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183.
170. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1240 (West 1966); FED. R. EvID. 803(1), (2).
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i. Present Sense Impressions
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, present sense impressions are
statements made by the declarant in the course of describing or explain-
ing an event or condition as it is happens or immediately thereafter.
7 1
Reliability of the statement is based upon the immediacy with which the
statement is made in relation to the observation of the event. 112 Immedi-
acy implies, presumably, that there was insufficient time for the declarant
to reflect and deliberate and insufficient time for the event or condition to
fade from the declarant's memory. 7 3 Hence, it is less likely that the
statement is the result of fabrication or misrepresentation.
174
Although a crime scene videotape potentially falls within this excep-
tion, it should not be included. Because of the codes, the videotape
serves as the producer's nonverbal narration of the crime scene. This
narration is given while simultaneously viewing the crime scene, hence
the required immediacy of the statement is established. However, the
presumption given to the immediacy of the declaration is actually ne-
gated by the taping process. The production codes reflect the subjectivity
of the producer. Their selection is based upon their ability to convey the
meaning the producer has chosen to assign to the content. Indeed, the
medium demands that the producer exercise subjectivity, because the
codes are designed specifically to attract and hold attention and, more
importantly, to instruct. Such instruction is dependent upon the motiva-
tions and reasoning of the producer. The medium cannot choose to tape
an image by itself. Thus, contrary to the concept of a present sense im-
pression, a crime scene videotape narrates the producer's conscious re-
flection of the scene. And that reflection is extremely susceptible to
fabrication, because the medium not only demands that the producer ex-
ercise subjectivity, but it also allows biases to be implemented in a man-
ner that its viewers will understand.
ii. Excited Utterances
Like a present sense impression, an excited utterance is regarded as
reliable because of the circumstances in which the statement is made. An
excited utterance is a declaration made while under the stress of excite-
ment caused by an event.'7 5 The exception's premise is that shock or
171. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
172. FED. R. EvID. 803(1) advisory committee's notes.
173. Id. Immediacy is not an absolute requirement. A small lapse of time is allowed for
the statement to be made. Id.
174. Id.
175. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee's notes.
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excitement stalls the declarant's ability to reflect, thereby minimizing the
likelihood that the statement was fabricated.
17 6
A crime scene videotape does not fit within this exception. Primar-
ily, it is not obvious that the video, as the producer's statement, is taped
while the producer is in a state of shock or excitement at the sight of a
crime scene. Police officers, who generally are the producers of the vide-
otapes, arguably are not in a state of shock or excitement.17 7 In contrast
to ordinary citizens, police officers are trained not to react to stress or
excitement, are more likely to view violence, and may even, as a result of
their job, become desensitized to the horrible aspects of a crime. Second,
as in the case of a present sense impression, the taping process demands
deliberation from the producer. Such necessary deliberation negates the
assumption that the stress or excitement caused by the scene overcomes
the reflective powers of the declarant. Indeed, even if the scene does gen-
erate excitement or stress, one may argue that these conditions direct the
police officer to use the production codes intentionally in a biased
manner. 178
iii. Official Records
In California, the crime scene videotape may also fall within the
exception created for official records and other official writings.1 79 The
records and reports of public officials, who are required either by statute
or the general nature of their duties to create and maintain such docu-
ments, are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. 8° These docu-
ments are admissible if the writing was within the public official's scope
176. Id.
177. Cf Lira v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 559 A.2d 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). In Lira,
a throat specialist's examination of patient's throat and subsequent statement, "Who's the
butcher who [did] this to you?," was held inadmissible hearsay and not an excited utterance or
present sense impression. Id. at 554. The examination itself could not have produced shock-
ing circumstances that caused the specialist to be overcome with excitement or emotion. Id.
Furthermore, the statement was found to be an expression based on medical training and
experience, rather than one that was instinctual and without deliberation. Id.
178. Id.
179. California also maintains a hearsay exception for business records. The requirements
are similar to the exception for official writings with additional requirements: (a) the writing
was made in the regular course of a business; (b) the writing was made at or near the time of
the act, condition, or event; (c) the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity
and the mode of its preparation; and (d) the sources of information and method and time of
preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271 (West
1966). The foundation requirements for a crime scene videotape satisfy requirement (c).
Thus, the analysis of a crime scene videotape is the same as that of an official writing excep-
tion.
However, under the Federal Rules of Evidence public records exception, a crime scene
videotape would most likely be inadmissible. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
180. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1280(a) (West 1966).
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of duty and was made at or near the event.' Additionally, the prepara-
tion time, method, and source of the official record must manifest
trustworthiness. 1
8 2
Trustworthiness of the document, or at least of its source, is based
on the assumption that the duty of the public official to make an accurate
statement ensures that the statement is properly made and accurate. 83
The official writings hearsay exception rests on a presumption that (1)
public officials will perform their duties properly, and (2) public records
assist the official's recall of the event given the likelihood of a faulty
memory. 184
A crime scene videotape arguably fits within the scope of Califor-
nia's exceptions for official or business writings. The videotape satisfies
the exception's components. It is a visual record, taped by a police of-
ficer at the scene of the crime, usually upon or close to the crime's dis-
covery. As an investigatory procedure, the videotape falls within the
police officer's scope and general business duty. Thus the requirements
of a public official acting within the scope of duty and timeliness are
satisfied. Additionally, the trustworthiness of the videotape's source and
method of preparation is established by the presumption afforded to the
status of the police officer and her duty to report facts and observations
correctly.
However, a crime scene videotape should be exempted from the ex-
ception's scope. Arguably, its source and method of preparation do not
deserve the presumption of trustworthiness simply because the tape was
created by a public official, here a police officer, who has a duty to report
facts and observations accurately. The status of an official should not
necessarily confer reliability on a statement; officials have been known to
fabricate, misrepresent, or omit facts.
Particularly in the case of a crime scene videotape, the source should
be viewed warily. As discussed above, the effect of the production codes
transforms the videotape into the police officer's testimony of her obser-
vations of the crime scene. Such observations may be subject to the po-
lice officer's prejudices, motivations, and intentions. Indeed, it is because
181. Id. § 1280(a), (b).
182. Id. § 1280(c).
183. "It is the influence of the official duty, broadly considered, which is taken as the suffi-
cient element of trustworthiness, justifying the acceptance of the hearsay statement." Fisk v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 179 Cal. Rptr. 379, 381 (Ct. App. 1982). See also People v.
Baeske, 130 Cal. Rptr. 35, 39 (Ct. App. 1976) ("The trustworthiness requirement for this
exception ... is established by a showing that the written report is based upon the observa-
tions of public employees who have a duty to observe the facts and report and record them
correctly.").
184. Fisk, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note).
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of the grave potential for abuse that a crime scene videotape would be
excluded under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) expressly excludes from the public
records and reports exception records of police observations made while
in the course of duty."' 5 This exclusion was based on the recognition
that such observations are inherently unreliable due to the adversarial
relationship of the defendant and the police and the potential violation of
the Confrontation Clause.1 8 6 Furthermore, if the observation is to be
presented before the trier of fact it must be through the testimony of the
observing officer, subject to proof of unavailability. 8 7
An additional danger of including a crime scene videotape in the
official writing hearsay exception is equating the effect of written records
with that of a videotape. A written document describing the crime scene
does not connote realism and accuracy the way a videotape does. It will
not have the same effect of immediacy, nor can it transform the crime
scene into a real experience for the jurors. It cannot capture the jurors'
attention as raptly as a crime scene videotape. A crime scene videotape is
simply a much more dramatic and powerful presentation of evidence.
The danger is that the production codes in a crime scene videotape will
teach a biased message to jurors who are completely unaware that they
are learning it.
Finally, even if a crime scene videotape were ruled to fit within the
scope of the exception, official writings have not expressly been recog-
nized as "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions." 8
b. Other Indicia of Reliability
The Supreme Court has stated that hearsay evidence that is not
firmly rooted yet carries "guarantees of trustworthiness" meets the con-
stitutional standard of the Confrontation Clause and is therefore admissi-
ble.18 9  In Idaho v. Wright,190 the Court stated that "guarantees of
185. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) pertains to: "Records, reports, statements ... in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth ... matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law
as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel ... "
186. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8) notes of committee on the judiciary; 120 CONG. REC. H563-
65 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (amendment offered by Rep. Dennis).
187. LILLY, supra note 141, § 7.19. See also FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(b) notes of committee
on the judiciary.
188. See supra note 169.
189. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) ("In other cases, the evidence must be ex-
cluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."); Idaho v.
Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990) (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1985)).
190. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). In Wright, respondent was convicted of lewd conduct with her
two minor daughters. Id. at 812. At trial, the younger daughter was found incapable "of
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trustworthiness" may only be derived from the "totality of circumstances
attending the making of the statement [which] render the declarant par-
ticularly worthy of belief."19' Furthermore, there is no "mechanical
test" to determine "particular guarantees of trustworthiness."' 92 The
unifying principle appears to be factors that show the declarant was
probably telling the truth when the statement was made. 193
The totality of circumstances surrounding the making of a crime
scene videotape reveals that the videotape does not carry sufficient guar-
antees of trustworthiness. The fact that the crime scene videotape "inter-
locks" with other evidence, such as a witness's testimony, does not
necessarily mean that it is entirely reliable. The Wright Court, relying on
Lee v. Illinois, 94 rejected the "interlock theory" as "selective reliabil-
ity.' 195 In Lee, the Court rejected respondent's contention that a defend-
ant's confession was necessarily reliable in its entirety because it
"interlocked" on some facts with the confession of a codefendant,
although the confession's accuracy was increased. 196 The danger of con-
ferring selective reliability on the hearsay evidence, here a presumptively
unreliable confession, disregarded the very real dangers of the declarant's
insincerity and strong motive to fabricate his statement.' 97 Similarly, the
Wright Court stated that although medical evidence did corroborate the
communicating to the jury." Id. at 809. Instead, the pediatrician who examined the younger
daughter testified to statements made by her during the examination. Id. at 809-11. The mi-
nor had reluctantly answered the doctor's questions regarding the sexual abuse. Id. at 811.
However, she voluntarily commented on the sexual abuse of her older sister. Id. The pediatri-
cian's testimony was admitted pursuant to the state's residual hearsay exception. Id. at 811-
12. On appeal, the conviction was reversed on the grounds that the pediatrician's testimony
did not fall within a traditional hearsay exception. Id. at 812. Furthermore, the interview
itself lacked procedural safeguards, as the interview was not taped and used leading questions.
Id. at 812-13. The Idaho Supreme Court held respondent's federal rights under the Confronta-
tion Clause were violated. Id. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of re-
spondent's conviction by the state supreme court. Id. at 827. Applying Roberts, 448 U.S. at
56, the Court found that the residual hearsay exception was not one firmly rooted in jurispru-
dence. Id. at 815-17. Furthermore, the Court rejected the state's argument that particular
guarantees of trustworthiness may be based on any corroborative evidence that was admitted
at trial. Id. at 819. Instead the Court held that the Confrontation Clause demanded particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness "from the totality of circumstances that surround the
making of the statement" and which make the declarant credible. Id. at 820. Review by the
Court revealed that the hearsay testimony lacked such particular guarantees of trustworthi-
ness. Id. at 827.
191. Wright, 497 U.S. at 820-21. Other corroborative evidence cannot be used to "boot-
strap" the statement as trustworthy, which would be at odds with the Confrontation Clause.
Id. at 823.
192. Id. at 822.
193. Id.
194. 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1985).
195. Wright, 497 U.S. at 824.
196. Lee, 476 U.S. at 545-46.
197. Id.
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child's statements concerning sexual abuse, such corroboration did not
confer reliability on the child's statement as to the identity of the
abuser. 98 Allowing such an inference ignored the danger that "the jury
will use partial corroboration to mistakenly infer the trustworthiness of
the entire statement."1 99
Allowing the child's statements to necessarily acquire reliability due
entirely to the arguably objective medical evidence maintains the danger
of selective reliability. An inference is allowed that disregards the insin-
cerity and unreliability of the declarant. This criticism applies to a crime
scene videotape. The fact that videotape is corroborated by other evi-
dence, such as a witness's testimony, does not necessarily mean that the
videotape is reliable in its entirety. More importantly, it ignores the
grave danger posed by the declarant's insincerity, such as a motive to
seek retribution, or to divert attention toward irrelevant but highly in-
flammatory facts.
In the previous section it was argued that a crime scene videotape
does not fit within the excited utterance exception because there clearly
exists an opportunity and ability to fabricate. Indeed, the use of the pro-
duction codes and the deliberation necessary for their selection negate
any presumption that the taping of the crime scene is free of bias or
fabrication. More indicative of the crime scene videotape's unreliability
is the existence, rather than absence, of a motive to falsify. Perhaps the
suggestion that the police operate from a strong motive to portray the
crime scene falsely is too harsh. However, there can be no denying that
the police maintain strong biases that have and do influence their investi-
gatory procedures. 2" Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), by expressly ex-
cluding records that attest to police observations, gives credence to the
suspicion that police biases will decrease the reliability of evidence based
on their personal observations.
In fairness, it must be acknowledged that the foundation require-
ments do establish some reliability. However, the foundation criteria do
not meet the constitutional standard of reliability required by the Con-
198. Wright, 497 U.S. at 824 ("Corroboration of a child's allegations of sexual abuse by
medical evidence ... sheds no light on the reliability of the child's allegations regarding the
identity of the abuser.").
199. Id.
200. Tactics used by the police in obtaining confessions, in searches and seizures, and in
conducting drug investigations illustrate biased police investigation practices. See, e.g., United
States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981) (heightening mother's fears about never seeing
child again in order to extract confession); People v. Collazo, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 842 (Ct. App.
1992) (presenting affidavit to magistrate without good faith belief in its sufficiency to establish
probable cause); People v. Gentry, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 742 (Ct. App. 1992) (warrentless arrest and
detainment); People v. Hernandez, 277 Cal. Rptr. 327 (Ct. App. 1991) (police failure to re-
spect defendant's right to remain silent).
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frontation Clause. The Court's interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause extols cross examination as the primary means to test and confirm
the reliability of hearsay statements. Cross examination allows counsel
to scrutinize testimony for misrepresentations, evasions, biases, and inac-
curacies in memory and perception. Cross examination also allows the
jury to observe the witness's ability to withstand such scrutiny and serves
as an indicator of the witness's credibility. In essence, the Court is saying
that when indicia of reliability are substituted for cross examination, the
result is the same. In other words, the circumstances or factors consid-
ered indicia of reliability safeguard the testimony to the extent that, had
scrutiny from cross examination occurred, no additional information
would have been gained that would alter the credibility and trustworthi-
ness of the statement or the declarant.2 °1
Unfortunately, the foundation requirements 20 2 do not guarantee the
same level of credibility and trustworthiness as cross examination. An
attestation to the accuracy and faithfulness of the videotape merely
means that the picture viewed on the screen was indeed the picture
taped. However, questions about accuracy and faithfulness most likely
will not provide answers pertaining to the use of the production codes.
And it is the selection and use of the production codes, not the visual
imagery, that brings into question the reliability of the crime scene video-
tape. While the medium hides the producer, the production codes em-
ployed in the crime scene videotape focus the viewers' attention and
convey the producer's biased message. Cross examination about the
choice of production codes is absolutely necessary to expose the pro-
ducer's biases and hidden meanings to the judiciary and the jury.
Furthermore, the foundation requirements fail to meet the constitu-
tional standard of reliability, because they do not allow the accused an
opportunity to confront the producer. A witness who is not the producer
may be able to assert that the videotape is a faithful depiction. However,
such a witness cannot answer questions concerning the use of the produc-
tion codes. If the person laying the foundation to the crime scene video-
tape is not the actual producer, any questions about the filming of the
201. Wright, 497 U.S. at 821 ("Because evidence possessing 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness' must be at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay
exception .... we think that evidence admitted under the former requirement must similarly be
so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability."); see also 5 WIG-
MORE, supra note 141, § 1420, at 251.
202. Again, the admission of a crime scene videotape is predicated on its foundation of
accuracy and faithfulness as established at trial by a competent witness who has personal
knowledge of the correctness of the representation. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503,
506 (8th Cir. 1972); People v. Moran, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413, 420-21 (Ct. App. 1974). The witness
who lays this foundation, however, does not necessarily have to be the person who filmed the
videotape. People v. Bowley, 382 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1964).
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videotape, its production techniques, and the motivations and rationales
for the production codes will be excluded on the basis of speculation or
* 203opinion.
In short, the foundation requirements cannot be considered indicia
of reliability for the constitutional standard of the Confrontation Clause,
because the credibility and trustworthiness of the videotape may signifi-
cantly change upon cross examination of the producer.
V
Proposed Solutions
A. Require Producers to Testify Before the Trier of Fact
The foundation requirements of both the federal and California
Rules of Evidence should be amended to mandate that the producer of
the videotape testify before the trier of fact. In effect, this would estab-
lish a rule of unavailability, because requiring the physical presence of
the producer may not be possible in every circumstance, such as when
the producer has died or is ill. In these situations the rules should re-
quire an offer of proof of the unavailability of the producer. Arguably,
imposing proof of unavailability runs counter to the Court's decision in
White v. Illinois.2°  In White, the Court examined proof of unavailability
as a broad requirement and reasoned that it assisted little in the fact find-
ing process while imposing a substantial burden on the prosecution.
203. This of course raises a rule of necessity requiring proof of unavailability before a hear-
say statement is admissible. In White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), the Supreme Court
overruled proof of unavailability as a constitutional threshold requirement of the Confronta-
tion Clause whenever hearsay evidence is offered into proof, unless otherwise required by the
rule. See infra note 204.
204. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992). In White, the four-year-old victim identified the respondent
and stated details of the sexual attack to her babysitter, mother, a police officer, and hospital
staff. Id. at 739. These statements were made within hours after the attack had occurred. Id.
At trial the victim was unable to testify. Id. Instead, the five adults testified at trial and
relayed her statements. Id. at 739-40. Respondent challenged his conviction of criminal sex-
ual assault, residential burglary, and unlawful restraint on the grounds that the prosecution
had failed to present the minor witness or show her unavailability, as dictated by Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). White, 112 S. Ct. at 740. See supra note 163. The Court applied
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392 (1986), which had expressly negated the broad rule of
Roberts that "no out-of-court statement would be admissible without a showing of unavailabil-
ity." White, 112 S. Ct. at 741. The Court expressly restricted Roberts to require a showing of
unavailability only where out-of-court statements, such as former testimony, were made in a
pretrial judicial proceeding. Id. at 742. In so holding, the Court reaffirmed Roberts's broader
holding that the Confrontation Clause's preference for cross examination may be substituted
by a showing of reliability. Id. at 743. An out-of-court statement encompassed by a firmly
rooted hearsay exception provides the requisite guarantees of reliability. Id. In White, sponta-
neous declarations and statements made for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis
constituted two firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, and thus were admissible over respondent's
Confrontation Clause objection. Id. at 742.
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However, the White court's arguments against the use of an unavailabil-
ity analysis do not maintain their force in the context of a crime scene
videotape.
The White Court placed considerable focus on the substantial finan-
cial burden and difficulty imposed on the prosecution to locate and pro-
duce the hearsay declarant throughout the trial process.20 5  In the
context of a crime scene videotape, this burden does not seem as heavy as
that described in White. Essentially, the prosecution requires the testi-
mony of only one person, who is usually a law enforcement agent, and
thus not difficult to contact.
Furthermore, White did not negate the requirement of an unavaila-
bility analysis in every circumstance. 2" Unavailability is not required
when it adds little to the reliability of the hearsay statement, because the
circumstances of the statement cannot be replicated.207 Certain circum-
stances provide much of the basis for the statement's truthfulness and
believability, such as statements made by co-conspirators while conspir-
ing, or spontaneous declarations.20 8
This argument is not germane to a crime scene videotape because
the technology allows the producer to capture and replicate the circum-
stances that provide a basis for his testimony. Additionally, the circum-
stances of the producer's testimony are not similar to those that are cited
as a basis for a statement's credibility, as is true for a spontaneous decla-
ration. A spontaneous declaration is regarded as credible because the
declarant's ability to deliberate is overcome by excitement, thereby low-
ering the likelihood that the statement is fabricated. However, a crime
scene videotape is not an impulsive statement made by the producer. In-
deed, if anything, the use of the production codes in a crime scene video-
tape is the result of the producer's deliberate selection and reasoning. It
is highly susceptible to fabrication, because the production codes are cho-
sen according to the subjective intention of the producer and the techno-
205. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742.
206. The Court expressly stated that the admissibility of former testimony is still contin-
gent upon the showing of the declarant's unavailability. Id. at 741. However, the Court's
statement does not necessarily impose a constitutional requirement of unavailability in regard
to former testimony. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a), proof of unavailability is a
threshold requirement of former testimony, before it can be admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. FED. R. EvID. 804(a), (b)(1).
207. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743. In the context of former testimony, the Court reasoned, the
statements are merely repeated at trial and are less likely to lose their evidentiary value. In
contrast, the material factors that contribute to the reliability of a hearsay statement, such as a
spontaneous declaration, cannot be replicated before the trier of fact. Little evidentiary value
is added to the truth finding process by requiring proof of unavailability in all cases. Id. at
742-43.
208. Id. at 742-43.
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logical capabilities of the medium. Hence, the circumstances of a crime
scene videotape do not necessarily serve as a basis for the crime scene
videotape's credibility.
Indeed, given the subtlety of the codes and the grave danger a crime
scene videotape imposes, requiring proof of unavailability serves as an
additional reliability safeguard and protects the integrity of the Confron-
tation Clause itself.2' Because the crime scene videotape is not looked at
as hearsay evidence, the prosecution may exercise discretion in calling
the producer to lay the requisite foundation. And it may be that in many
cases, the prosecution does call the producer to lay the foundation.
However, because of the medium's communicative abilities, allowing the
prosecution to decide whether or not to call the producer gives the prose-
cutor too much discretionary power to the detriment of the defense.
Conversely, relying on the defense, either under the Compulsory Process
Clause or subpoena, to compel the producer to testify is also too great of
a risk. The producer must take the stand whenever possible and be cross
examined. A rule of unavailability pressures the prosecution to do every-
thing possible to ensure that confrontation between the defendant and
the producer will occur.
209. Professor Eileen Scallen asserts that a three-dimensional approach should be used to
evaluate a Confrontation Clause challenge. Currently only one prong of that model, the evi-
dentiary value, is utilized by the Court. However, incorporating prosecutorial and societal
values into the present Confrontation Clause framework would render more reasonable and
consistent results. Eileen Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions Of Hearsay Reform: Toward a
Three Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623 (1992).
Under a prosecutorial restraint model, courts distinguish between hearsay statements
given freely by the declarant and those extracted by the misconduct of the prosecution or their
agents. The latter hearsay statements would be subject to a presumption of inadmissibility,
rebuttable only upon a sufficient showing that misleading questions or instructions were not
used to elicit the statements. See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Con-
frontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557
(1992).
The societal dimension contends that a face-to-face encounter is necessary "as part of the
social relationship between the individual defendant and the accusing witness." Scallen, supra,
at 642. Furthermore, face-to-face confrontation also represents the social relationship of the
accused and the accusatory system, the state. Id. This relationship imposes an ethical duty on
the state to do everything possible to afford an actual confrontation between the defendant and
declarant of the hearsay statement. Id. at 644-45. Alternatively, when the hearsay declarant
is unavailable, the state must impose stringent standards of reliability and, more importantly,
offer proof that no misconduct on the part of the prosecution produced the hearsay statement.
Id.
Consideration of all three dimensions demonstrates that the Confrontation Clause consti-
tutionally mandates actual face-to-face confrontation. Only a compelling reason overrides the
required encounter between the accused and the witnesses against her, and even then dictates
higher standards of reliability and proof that the hearsay evidence is not manufactured by the
prosecutor or the government. Id. at 645-54. Under this three-pronged approach, requiring
proof of unavailability of the videotape producer is one safeguard required by the Confronta-
tion Clause.
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Confrontation and its inherent protections are critical. Perhaps the
greatest danger posed by a crime scene videotape is the potential absence
of cross examination of the producer. Defense counsel must cross ex-
amine the producer about the production codes in order to expose to the
jury the intended message or bias in the crime scene videotape. The
videotape machine cannot provide the answers. While any witness pres-
ent at the videotaping of the crime scene may be able to testify to its
accuracy and faithfulness, only the producer can testify to the motiva-
tions and reasoning behind the selection of the production codes used.
Questioning the witness, not the producer, at best provides information
that is mere speculation or an opinion. Suggested questions in Rodri-
gues2  might have included:
1. Was there footage cut from the tape or images not filmed?
2. If there was other footage, where is it?
3. What was the reason for the use of zoom shots on the blood stains?
4. Why did so many of the bloodstains receive zoom shots?
5. What was the reason for the zoom shot of the deceased's bloody
palm?
6. Given that the first pan of the body provided an adequate view,
what was the reason for the close-up shots of the deceased's face
and chest?
It is imperative that questions are asked that are targeted at expos-
ing the objective of the production codes employed and that show jurors
that their observations may be biased by the producer's motivations and
intentions. In fact, this may be the only way the defense can negate the
immediacy, realism, and credibility conveyed by a crime scene videotape.
Because a crime scene videotape is filmed close to the commission of the
crime and during the investigatory phase, usually before there is a sus-
pect or a defendant, it is highly unlikely that the defense will have the
same opportunity to videotape the crime scene.
The compelled testimony of the producer requires that she take an
oath before the jury. Although regarded as a lower measure of reliability
than cross examination, the taking of an oath is still an additional safe-
guard in the fact finding process of a trial. An oath pressures a witness,
morally and with the threat of contempt, to give honest statements to the
jury.21I Hence, the oath helps to ensure that hidden information will be
exposed to the jurors.
The physical presence of the producer similarly provides a basis for
the jury to assess the producer's credibility. Allowing the jury an oppor-
tunity to observe the witness's demeanor may not be as effective an evi-
210. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
211. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) ("Confrontation ... insures that the
witness will give his statements under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the
matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of penalty for perjury .... ").
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dentiary safeguard as cross examination; nonetheless, great credence is
given to the jury's assessment of a witness's conduct and manner. Al-
lowing the jury to observe the producer physically assists in its determi-
nation of the videotape's credibility. Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has
stated that the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule, while not
wholly complementary to each other, "are generally designed to protect
similar values," primarily the reliability of the proffered testimony.
While conceding that the right is not absolute, the Court continues to
assert that face-to-face confrontation between the accused and the wit-
nesses is the preference expressed by the Clause. Such a preference stems
from a deeply held perception, as Justice Scalia pointed out in Coy v.
Iowa, that "confrontation between the accused and accuser [is] essential
to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution." '212
Viewed as such, confrontation supports a policy intrinsic to the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, "to secure fairness in administration."'2
13
Amending the foundation requirements to compel the testimony of the
producer of the crime scene videotape effectuates this policy of securing a
fair trial. The Supreme Court has recounted on numerous occasions that
the historical origin of the Confrontation Clause was the abusive use by
prosecuting magistrates of ex parte affidavits or depositions as conclusive
proof of the accused's guilt and the denial of an opportunity for the ac-
cused to confront his accusers.214 Remarkably, a crime scene videotape
operates in a similar fashion.2"5
Given that ours is a high technology society, a crime scene video-
tape can be viewed as the modern equivalent of an ex parte affidavit,
which the Confrontation Clause was intended to eliminate from court-
room proceedings. The videotape is taped by the police, agents of the
prosecution. Because it is taped during the investigatory stage, there are
no safeguards to ensure against police misconduct via the use of the pro-
duction codes. Indeed, defense counsel has no opportunity to participate
in, or to protest, the taping or its method. And while the videotape may
not communicate that the particular defendant committed the alleged
crime, the use of the production codes certainly can communicate to the
jurors that someone needs to be punished. Because of the production
codes, the credibility, and the accuracy associated with the medium,
showing a crime scene videotape communicates a very real and immedi-
ate experience, one that is difficult to forget. Finally, the effect of not
212. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404
(1965)).
213. FED. R. EvID. 102.
214. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844-45 (1990); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
156-57 (1970); see also Margaret A. Berger's prosecutorial model, supra note 209.
215. See Berger, supra note 209.
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compelling the producer to testify is analogous to the prosecuting magis-
trate's denial of a confrontation between the accused and the witness be-
hind the ex parte affidavit.
Viewed in this light, the admission procedures and the use of a
crime scene videotape seriously impugn the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem. Their use may be interpreted as a judicial sanction of government-
manufactured evidence without a viable means of rebuttal. It suggests
that the underlying policy of "fairness in administration," as stated in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, is merely a policy of printed words, not ac-
tion. When considering this stain upon the judicial system, amending the
foundation rules to require the testimony of the producer does not appear
burdensome. Short of exclusion per se of the crime scene videotape, it is
the most viable solution to the grave dangers a crime scene videotape
poses to the defense and to the reputation of the courts.
B. Apply the Frye Test to a Crime Scene Videotape
Currently, California and the federal courts use the standard rele-
vance approach to determine the admissibility of a crime scene videotape.
Under this approach, a crime scene videotape admission is predicated
upon three requirements: (1) fulfillment of the foundation requirements;
(2) relevance; and (3) probative value that substantially outweighs the
dangers posed by its admission.216
Although this approach does ensure some reliability, it is not ade-
quate when consideration is given to the dangers posed by the production
features. Alternatively, applying the Frye test 217 to a crime scene video-
tape, in addition to revising the foundation requirements, will increase its
reliability. Thus, prior to the admission of a crime scene videotape, the
court should determine whether the reliability of the medium of video-
tape is established and generally accepted by mass communication re-
searchers and social scientists.
Traditionally, the Frye test was utilized by both federal and Califor-
nia courts to determine the reliability of new scientific evidence, most
notably polygraph tests.218 Under Frye, the determination of reliability is
216. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352; see also notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
217. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923):
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific princi-
ple or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.
218. People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982).
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not at the discretion of the trial judge, rather that conclusion is assigned
to the community from which scientific evidence emerges.219 Essentially
Frye requires the party offering the scientific evidence to demonstrate "by
means of qualified and disinterested experts that the new technique is
generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community.
220
The general acceptance of the method by the scientific community is thus
dispositive.22'
The Frye test is well recognized in California law.222 Arguably, a
crime scene videotape fits within its scope. Evidence is subjected to the
Frye test when it is "developed by" or "based upon" novel scientific
methods. 223 The California Supreme Court interprets "scientific tech-
nique" broadly. For example, the court considers testimony that is de-
rived from "purely psychological" techniques to be scientific
testimony.224 Given this liberal approach by California, it seems highly
possible that a crime scene videotape can be categorized as evidence
based on a new scientific technique. A crime scene videotape is the prod-
uct of technology or commercial science.225 If the court is willing to
include psychological methods within the test's umbrella, it should sub-
ject to the Frye test evidence that is derived from the techniques of com-
mercial science.
219. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976).
220. Shirley, '723 P.2d at 1376.
221. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244 (citing United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C.
Cir. 1974)).
222. Currently, California continues to apply the Frye test. See Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1374;
People v. Diggs, 169 Cal. Rptr. 386, 391 (Cal. 1980). The federal courts also apply Frye. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 320 (1992); United States v. Soloman, 753 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1985). However, in
the federal courts the general acceptance test is subject to criticism. See Brief for a Group of
American Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2-12, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
320 (1992). Opponents argue that Frye is an inappropriate, unworkable standard to test the
reliability of scientific evidence because of its susceptibility to manipulation, the difficulty in
ascertaining the "pertinent" field of experts, and the test's exclusion of new scientific evidence
and techniques, which may be potentially probative, but have not achieved the required con-
sensus. Id. at 2-12. See also LILLY, supra note 141, § 12.4 n.6 (The trend in the federal courts
toward Frye is to modify or lower the standard or abandon the test altogether in favor of the
relevancy approach; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993)).
223. Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1374 (citing Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1245).
224. Id. at 1374-75. Indeed, the court has already held that Frye applies to other techno-
logical devices used for investigative purposes. See People v. Wochnick, 219 P.2d 70 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1950) (polygraph testing); Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1240 (voiceprint analysis).
225. Technology is defined as "the application of science, especially to industrial or com-
mercial objectives." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1248 (2d college ed. 1985). High
technology is "technology involving highly advanced or specialized systems or devices." Id. at
612.
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Another basis for applying the Frye test to a crime scene videotape is
that the test has been employed to ensure the reliability of evidence
shown to be highly susceptible to suggestiveness. A comparison with
hypnosis demonstrates the applicability of the Frye test to a crime scene
videotape.
In People v. Shirley,226 the California Supreme Court held that the
admission of testimony obtained after hypnosis required satisfaction of
Frye requirements. Careful review of the jurisprudence concerning hyp-
nosis revealed a uniform finding that testimony derived from hypnosis
was inherently unreliable because it was a "product of the technique." '227
The court expressly declined to adopt procedural safeguards.22 Instead,
the court opted to apply the Frye test, because "[i]f the testimony is thus
only as reliable as the hypnotic process itself, it must be judged by the
same standards of admissibility.229 An examination of the grounds for
the court's conclusion supports the contention that the picture and testi-
mony conveyed by a crime scene videotape are also products of the
technique.
In Shirley, testimony recalled through hypnosis was found to be
prejudiced because of the subject's high susceptibility to the hypnotist's
suggestions and biases. 230 Hypnosis was also cited to be typically per-
formed by a police officer.2 31 Concerns raised by the professional litera-
ture about this law enforcement practice were viewed by the court as
supportive of the unreliability of the hypnotic process.
2 32
Similarly, the crime scene conveyed through the videotape is often
reflective of the suggestions and biases of its producer. Interestingly,
crime scene videotapes are also typically filmed by police officers. Con-
cerns cited in Shirley apply with the same force to a crime scene video-
tape. The selection of the production codes and sequence of the images
filmed are based on the subjective reasoning and motivations of the law
enforcement agent. As stated in Shirley, police officers' " orientation is
226. 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982).
227. Id. at 1375.
228. Id. at 1365.
229. Id. at 1375.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1383.
232. Id. (quoting W. Kroger & Douce, Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation, 27 INT'L J.
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 358, 365-67 (1979)):
Police officers typically have had limited technical training and lack the broad under-
standing of psychology and psychopathology. Their orientation is to obtain the in-
formation needed to solve a crime rather than a concern focusing on protecting the
health of the subject who was either witness to, or a victim of, a crime. [They] under-
standably have strong views as to who is likely to be guilty of a crime and may easily
inadvertently bias the hypnotized subject's memories even without themselves being
aware of their actions.
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to obtain the information needed to solve a crime .... ,233 Perhaps that
orientation extends much further. Understandably, police officers also
have strong desires for conviction. It is entirely plausible that these "ori-
entations," either purposefully or inadvertently, taint the selection pro-
cess of the production codes. Indeed, the production features of the
medium are specifically designed to transmit to its audience the pro-
ducer's suggestions.
The hypnotic process has also been found untrustworthy because of
the tendency of the subject to confabulate memories.234 In a crime scene
videotape, the medium itself allows the producer to "confabulate" a
crime scene. Again, the medium may depict the imagery; however, pro-
duction codes are also used to relay and instruct viewers on the pro-
ducer's message. The end result is that the producer's subjective
meaning is added to the picture of the crime scene, giving the jury a
different picture from the one they might have seen had they actually
viewed the scene themselves. Such confabulation is intricately tied to the
producer's biases, as discussed above.
Testimony derived from hypnosis was also held unreliable in Shirley
because of the subject's inability to distinguish between actual memories
and those created via the hypnotic process. 235 A crime scene videotape is
subject to the same defect primarily because of the credibility afforded to
the medium. Videotape is accorded the same exalted status as television.
It is looked at as highly trustworthy, accurate, immediate, and real.236
The subjective selection process of the codes and the taping of the scenes
have the effect of displaying a very real experience to the jurors. The
effect is an inability to perceive the videotape as the producer's experi-
ence and illustration of the crime scene. Rather, jurors view the video-
tape as their own direct experience and adopt the producer's meaning as
their own.
Thus, the scene and testimony conveyed by a crime scene videotape
may be said to be the result of the taping process, a process that suffers
from the same defects of unreliability found in hypnosis. Ultimately, the
process conveys both a picture and testimony that is different from that
which the jury might have formed had they actually viewed the crime
scene themselves.
The underlying objectives of the Frye test support its application to
a crime scene videotape. The Frye test serves to impose judicial caution
against unrestrained acceptance of evidence derived from new scientific
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1373, 1375.
235. Id. at 1375.
236. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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methods.237 Unfortunately, unrestrained acceptance of videotaped evi-
dence by the judiciary appears to be the present trend. The only caution
exercised, aside from the requirement of a proper foundation, is the bal-
ancing procedure required by California Evidence Code section 352,
which rarely mandates exclusion. The focus of the judiciary is on the
visual content displayed by the medium, not the production techniques.
Yet the taping process, specifically the selection and use of the produc-
tion codes, renders the crime scene videotape extremely unreliable. Us-
ing experts who are familiar with the medium's intricacies to determine a
crime scene videotape's reliability, rather than the discretion of the trial
judge, would in effect impose caution in a manner that the current ap-
proach does not.
The current approach, under section 352, is not an adequate safe-
guard, because the judiciary suffers from the very perception that the
Frye test serves to prevent. Perhaps the primary objective of the Frye test
is to protect the jury from the influence of evidence that has attached to it
"a misleading aura of certainty. 2 38 Television is shrouded in percep-
tions of credibility, accuracy, fairness, and realism.2 39 Unfortunately, the
judiciary appears to perceive a crime scene videotape similarly. In the
criminal context, courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that the
medium can depict an inaccurate and biased picture. Indeed, concentra-
tion on the medium's ability to display visual content has led to a belief
that videotape actually preserves a defendant's rights and serves as a pro-
tection against police misconduct.2" While this may be true in other
factual contexts, it is not the case with a crime scene videotape. This
perception ignores the fact that the nonverbal characteristics of the me-
dium and the production codes tell an important message to jurors. And
jurors absorb the message as if it were their own.24 ' When the produc-
tion codes, coupled with the horrific visual images, are used, one can only
wonder about the overall role a crime scene videotape plays in the deter-
mination of a defendant's guilt. Thus, submitting a crime scene video-
tape to the Frye test serves as an effective method to educate or rebut the
judiciary's perception that the medium is accurate and fair, something
the current approach under section 352 has yet to do. More importantly,
237. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976).
238. Id.
239. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
240. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972).
241. The ultimate question, therefore, is whether the jurors follow their natural proclivity
and assign undue weight to the crime scene videotape in comparison to other evidence. As
evidenced by the interview with the juror from Cobb County, a crime scene videotape may be
the primary piece of evidence that influences a juror. See supra note 1.
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it may also prevent the jury from acting on this dangerous perception of
accuracy.
Additionally, the Frye test functions to promote judicial uniform-
ity.242 Again, under Frye, the admission of a crime scene videotape is
based on the conclusion of experts, who are familiar with the medium's
intrinsic capabilities, that the medium is reliable.2 4 3 Under the current
approach, reliability is established through the foundation requirements
and the judiciary's discretionary evaluation under section 352. The cur-
rent approach does not appear to have led to great inconsistency. Indeed
the overall pattern is to admit the crime scene videotape. Using the Frye
test ensures that inconsistencies will not happen. Until there is disposi-
tive proof that the medium, in the context of a crime scene videotape, is
generally accepted as reliable by the mass communications community,
the crime scene videotape must be excluded.
Finally, there are those who may protest that predicating the admis-
sion of a crime scene videotape on the Frye standard runs counter to
Frye's policy of judicial economy. It does not. First, the burden of show-
ing compliance with Frye rests on the prosecution, not the court.2 " Sec-
ond, proof of the standard does not necessarily incur heavy financial
costs. The court permits proof of the standard to be established through
the published works of experts, treatises, and journals in the field.245
Third, valuable time of the court is not wasted by having to evaluate
every single piece of evidence supporting the general acceptance of the
community.246 The prosecution is not required to submit nor is the court
obligated to review every piece of information.247 What is required is
that the prosecution submit a fair overview of the literature demonstrat-
ing consensus in the scientific community.248
C. Require That a Cautionary Jury Instruction Be Given
As noted above, production codes can lead jurors to assign undue
weight to videotape evidence. Currently, when a videotape is admitted, it
is unaccompanied by any juror instruction regarding production codes.
An instruction may, at least theoretically, assist in minimizing the grave
risks by warning jurors against the powerful emotional and cognitive ef-
242. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244-45.
243. Id. at 1244.
244. Under Frye, proof of the general standard in the community rests on the party offering
the evidence. People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1375-76 (Cal. 1982). The pertinent community
here is that of social psychology focused on the field of mass communications.
245. Id. at 1376.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id at 1377.
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fects of the production codes. Jurors should be instructed that the
images emphasized by the production codes, or the producer's specific
choice of a production code must not "take precedence over their in-




The premise of this note is that the dangers and detriments posed by
a crime scene videotape are not easily ascertainable by the judiciary.
Central to this premise is the similarity of videotape and television, and
the notion that the effects of the two media are similar, if not the same.
Television has carefully crafted and refined its methods of communi-
cation, and in doing so has created an influential nonverbal language that
becomes instinctual to its viewers. Viewers focus on the content of televi-
sion. Rarely do viewers question the method by which the medium con-
veys the content. As individuals living in a society that is highly
influenced by television, it is easy to understand why the judiciary and
even defense counselors focus on the dangers posed by the visual content
of the crime scene videotape, rather than the medium's production ef-
fects. And it is the jurors' susceptibility to the codes that makes a crime
scene videotape so prejudicial to the defense.
Crime scene videotapes do employ production codes, as evidenced
by Turner."' Their use, coupled with the realism, immediacy, and credi-
bility associated with the medium, dramatically illustrate the crime to the
jurors. Yet, the codes do more than illustrate. Their use allows a pro-
ducer to determine what jurors should see, pay attention to, and remem-
ber. More importantly, production codes determine jurors' reaction to
this scene. All this is conveyed through the guise of a neutral medium.
Yet it is not neutral. Its production features allow its producer to exer-
cise subjectivity and selectivity in order to shock, thrill, frighten, and
hold its viewers' attention. In short, the medium is only neutral if the
producer behind it is neutral.
The assumption of neutrality is reflected in the early opinions re-
garding videotapes and by the foundation requirements. In the criminal
context, courts have placed significant focus on the medium's ability to
display visual imagery accurately, and have given little credence to argu-
ments that challenge the reasoning or method of the tape. Although not
as apparent in the traditional applications of videotape technology, such
as depositions or confessions, a crime scene videotape strongly demon-
249. People v. Whitt, 685 P.2d 1161, 1175 (Cal. 1984).
250. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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strates the suggestive, biased nature of the medium. Through the use of
production codes, a crime scene videotape conveys to jurors more than
what is on the screen. A producer selectively chooses the images, their
sequence, the method of taping, and thereby the reaction of the viewer.
The production codes package the selected information accordingly.
Thus, the use of the production codes, not the visual imagery, transforms
the videotape into the testimony of the producer. As such, the video-
tape's dangers substantially outweigh its probative values and, more im-
portantly, the videotape constitutes hearsay evidence. Under the present
relevance approach, it can be shown to jurors without the appropriate
hearsay analysis. Ultimately, a crime scene videotape violates the de-
fendant's right to confront the witness under the Confrontation Clause,
and thus seriously calls into question the integrity of the judicial system.

